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CHOICE OF FEDERAL OR STATE LAW FOR
ATTORNEYS' PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
IN SECURITIES MATTERS
TED J. FIFLIS *
Professionalstandards of duty are implicated in the federal securities laws in two
types of cases: those instituted by the SEC to impose sanctions for lack of character
or unethical conduct and those brought by the SEC or private partiesfor violations
of substantive provisions of the securitieslaws. The questionfaced by ProfessorFiflis
is whether state or federal standards should define the duties imposed under these
laws. He argues that the proper method of resolving this question isto apply an
interest analysis. Analyzing the various state and federal interests leads Professor
Fiflis to the conclusion thatfederal courts and the SEC must look to state corporate
laws and rules of professional responsibility to assess the conduct of attorneys In
securities matters, except for appearancesbefore, and transactionsdirectly with, the
SEC.
INTRODUCTION

A generation ago Henry Hart noted that the law that "governs
daily living in the United States is a single system of law: it speaks in
relation to any particular question with only one ultimately authoritative voice, however difficult it may be on occasion to discern in
advance which of two or more conflicting voices really carries authority."'

One voice is necessary, he said, if we are to avoid forcing

people to react like Pavlov's dogs to conflicting rules, resulting eventually in the society's nervous breakdown.2 Which is that authoritative

voice for establishing attorneys' professional responsibilities in corporate law matters?
In a variety of actions ranging from publicity releases 3 through
injunctive suits 4 to rule 2(e) proceedings, 5 the Securities and Exchange
* Professor of Law, University of Colorado. I wish to express my gratitude to my colleagues,
Professors Clifford J. Calhoun and Homer H. Clark, and to my daughter, Christina Fiflis, Esq.,
who provided much helpful advice on a prior draft of this Article.
Hart, The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 Colum. L. Rev. 489, 489 (1954).
2 Id.
See, e.g., SEC Exch. Act Release No. 17,831 (June 1, 1981), (1981 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,874.
4 See, e.g., SECv. National Student Marketing Corp., 538 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977). The original Complaint, filed in 1972, is reproduced at [1971-1972
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,360 [hereinafter NSM Complaint], The 1977
settlement papers for the claims against the New York firm are reproduced at [1977-1978
Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH) 96,027. The principal opinion discussing attorneys'
responsibilities is found in 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978).
5 See, e.g., William R. Carter, SEC Exch. Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC Docket 292
(1981); Keating, Muething & Klekamp, SEC Exch. Act Release No. 15,982, 17 SEC Docket 1149
1236
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Commission (SEC or Commission) has sought to impose enforceable
duties upon attorneys who represent clients in the marketing of securities. These duties, developed through the Commission's "access theory, '' 6 are defined by federal standards of professional conduct for
attorneys that are independent of7 and generally more
expansive than
those standards traditionally imposed by state law.8 For example, in

(1979). See generally Marsh, Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus. Law. 9S7 (19S0).
Rule 2(e)(1) of the SEC's Rules of Practice, 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(c) (1981), reads:
(e) Suspension and disbarment.
(1) The Commission may deny, temporarily or permanently, the privilege of appearing or
practicing before it in any way to any person who is found by the Commission after notice
of and opportunity for hearing in the matter (i) not to possess the requisite qualifications to
represent others, or (ii) to be lacking in character or integrity or to have engaged In
unethical or improper professional conduct, or (iii) to have willfully violated, or willfully
aided and abetted the violation of any provision of the federal securities laws (15 U.S.C.
sees. 77a to 80b-20), or the rules and regulations thereunder.
8 See note 28 infra.
7 In two cases brought under rule 2(e), the SEC expressly refused to apply state standards of
professional responsibility under the securities laws. See Emmanuel Fields, 45 S.E.C. 262 (1973),
aff'd, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (federal rule of professional responsibility applies under
2(e)(1)(ii)); Statement of Legal Theories Underlying Paragraph 43(b) of the Order for Proceedings, William R. Carter, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 82,175 (July 24,
1978) (Admin. Proc. File No. 3-5464) (successfully urging adoption of a federal standard), reVd
on other grounds, 22 SEC Docket 323 (1981) [hereinafter Carter Pleading].
A proposal of the ABA Standing Committee on Professional Discipline, Rules of Federal
Agency Discipline, supports application of state standards except for transactions directly with
federal agencies. To my knowledge, no other sources address the issue whether state rules
regarding attorneys" professional responsibility should be adopted as federal law. I raised the
issue at the Southwestern Legal Foundation's Short Course in Securities Regulation, Dec. 10,
1981, in Dallas, Texas. After this Article went to press, the issue was adverted to by Edward F.
Greene, General Counsel to the SEC, in remarks to the New York County Lawyers" Assn (Jan.
13, 1982), reprinted in 14 See. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 168, 170 (1982) [hereinafter Greene
Speech]. A more radical and perhaps less defensible suggestion has been made in Note, SEC
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Attorneys Under Rule 2(e), 79 Mich. L. Rev. 1270, 1276-77
(1981) [hereinafter Michigan Note], in which the author, through analogy to Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977), and its abdication to state law for the regulation of corporate
fiduciary obligations, id. at 478-80, concludes that state rules of professional responsibility
should operate of their own force to regulate attorneys. This suggestion would call for a
construction of the various federal antifraud statutes to exclude breaches of professional duties
from their scope, just as Santa Fe excludes breaches of fiduciary duty from the scope of rule
10b-5.
8 There is general agreement that the SEC's standards exceed traditional bounds, see, e.g.,
The Evolving Problems For and Responsibilities of Attorneys Under the Federal Securities Laws,
A Program by the Comm. on Fed. Reg. of See. (Section of Corporation, Banking and Bus. Law)
and Comm. on See. Transactions (Section of Litigation), 36 Bus. Law. 1777 (1981) [hereinafter
Program]; Gruenbaum, Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers Obligations: A Response to Professor Kramer, 68 Geo. L.J. 191, 201 (1979); Mathews, SEC Injunctive Proceeding; Against
Attorneys, 36 Bus. Law. 1819, 1827 (1981); Pickholz, The Proposed Model Rules of Professional
Conduct-And Other Assaults Upon the Attorney-Client Relationship: Does "Serving the Public
Interest" Disserve the Public Interest?, 36 Bus. Law. 1841, 1848-61 (1981); Pitt, The Ceorge-
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its most extreme effort, the Commission shocked the bar by taking the
unprecedented position that attorneys representing corporate clients
are susceptible to liability under the federal securities laws' antifraud
provisions for failing to "blow the whistle" and disclose the wrongdoing of management and the board of directors to shareholders or the
SEC.9
If the Commission succeeds in imposing federal standards of
conduct in injunctive actions, presumably these standards also would
apply against attorneys in express or implied private actions under the
securities laws. Lawyers would then risk civil liability as principals or
secondary liability on a basis such as aiding and abetting.10
Although many express outrage at the Commission's attempt to
expand the duties of lawyers under the federal securities laws and feel
that the Commission exceeds its rulemaking authority when it prescribes new standards of professional conduct, few have successfully
identified a theory upon which to effectively challenge this assertion

town Proposals, 36 Bus. Law. 1831, 1838 (1981). Several commentators have noted the problems
that expansive SEC standards place on attorneys attempting to represent clients effectively. See,
e.g., Downing & Miller, The Distortion and Misuse of Rule 2(e), 54 Notre Dame Law. 774
(1979); Marsh, supra note 5, at 988-94. But see Gruenbaum, Corporate/Securities Lawyers:
Disclosure, Responsibility, Liability to Investors, and National Student Marketing Corp., 54
Notre Dame Law. 795, 800-04 (1979) (arguing that the securities lawyer's role as adviser rather
than advocate justifies the imposition of stringent duties under the SEC's access theory).
9 SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 699-701 (D.D.G. 1978); see
Comment, SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 25 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 79 (1979). Tie
issue of attorney liability was never fully resolved in the National Student Marketing litigation.
However, one court did state in its opinion that "the attorneys' responsibilities to their corporate
client required them to take steps to ensure that the information would be disclosed to the
shareholders." SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. at 713. See also Felts v.
National Account Sys. Ass'n, 469 F. Supp. 54, 67-68 (N.D. Miss. 1978) (finding that securities
laws place attorney under duty to disclose client's misrepresentations).
It generally is believed that the Commission has now retreated from this extreme position.
See Mathews, supra note 8, at 1829; Program, supra note 8; Pickholz, supra note 8, at 1846-47;
Timmeny, Reponsibilities of Lawyers in Connection with the Sale of Municipal Securities, 36
Bus. Law. 1799, 1802 (1981); Lawscope, 67 A.B.A.J. 1243 (1981). In William R. Garter, SEC
Exch. Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC Docket 292 (1981), the Commission expressly reserved the
question of the scope of an attorney's duties, thus throwing into question this general belief.
Duties of accountants, who historically have reported primarily to shareholders, present a
different issue. See Keating, Muething & Klekamp, SEC Exch. Act Release No. 15,982, 17 SEC
Docket 1149 (1979) (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting); Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountants'
Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 Vand. L. Rev. 31, 128-44 (1975).
10 For example, in one of several civil suits against the lawyers arising out of National
Student Marketing, plaintiffs sought to establish liability based on the expanded SEC formulation of lawyers' obligations. For a recent opinion in this ongoing litigation, see Wachovia Bank &
Trust Co. v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep.
(CCH) 97,712 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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of jurisdiction." The thesis of this Article is that modern judicial
policy established in recent Supreme Court decisions requires the SEC

to apply state corporation law, codes of professional responsibility,
and other state law as the single authoritative voice when assessing the

conduct of attorneys representing clients in securities-related matters.
Of course, federal law controls in these actions brought against

attorneys, but the question considered in this Article is whether state
standards must be adopted as federal law to define attorneys' duties
under the securities laws. The argument made here is that the traditional substantial interest of the states in determining the incidents of
the relationship between attorney and client' 2 and the Supreme
Court's recent decisions calling for greater incorporation of state law
in federal law determinations when a state governmental interest

outweighs competing federal interests' 3 compel adoption of state
standards. If state law standards are found to govern, then the Commission's more radical expansions of attorneys' duties will be substantially circumscribed 14 and securities lawyers will have a clearer and
more consistent definition of the duties under which they act in securities transactions, uncomplicated by conflicting state and federal
rules.'

5

In this Article, I first analyze how attorneys' professional conduct
gets called into question under federal securities law. I then consider

11See Marsh, supra note 5, at 1006-07 (noting the problems raised by expansive federal
standards and suggesting that Congress did not intend to grant the SEC authority to establish
such standards); Michigan Note, supra note 7.
12 See, e.g., Glazer v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 616 F.2d 167, 169 (5th Cir. 1980) (deferring to
state law concerning attorney's authority to settle federal claim largely because of the -states
substantial interest in defining the relationship between attorney and client"); Daley & Karmel,
Attorneys" Responsibilities: Adversaries at the Bar of the SEC, 24 Emory L.J. 747, 749 (1975).
13 See text accompanying notes 98-159 infra.
14 The respondents in William R. Carter, SEC Exch. Act. Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC
Docket 292 (1981), apparently so believed. In that case, the SEC staff sought to impose rule 2(e)
sanctions on two attorneys for their alleged breaches of duties arising under the expanded SEC
standards. The staff claimed that the attorneys' knowledge that the chief executive had ignored
their advice to disclose the deteriorating cash flow of the client corporation to its shareholders
gave rise to a duty to report such misconduct promptly to the board, and when the board failed
to take corrective action, to report this further misconduct to the shareholders or the SEC. The
decision of the administrative law judge, which found that the attorneys had failed to fulfill their
professional responsibilities, did not reach the issue whether the application of state law would
have made a difference. William R.Carter, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. See. L. Rep. (CCH)
82,175, at 82,181 (July 24, 1978) (Admin. Proc. File No. 3-5464). The respondents raised the
issue, however, and since the Carter Pleading, supra note 7, shows the Commission contested
their claim, both sides may have perceived at least some small advantage to respondents from
limiting attorney responsibility to that mandated by state rules.
1s See Marsh, supra note 5, at 1007.
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the recent development by the Supreme Court of principles for determining when state law should be adopted to give content to unspecified federal law. In the final section, these principles are applied to a
hypothetical case to illustrate how state law standards of professional
responsibility should be adopted to determine the duties of attorneys
acting in matters subject to federal securities regulation.
I
How

PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS AE IMPLICATED

UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

Before analyzing and applying the appropriate test to determine
whether state rules of professional responsibility should be incorpo-

rated into federal securities laws, detailed consideration must first be
given to how professional standards become involved in securities
litigation. Attorneys are infrequently charged as principals for securities violations.16 Rather, they are generally alleged to be secondarily liable for aiding and abetting principal violators. Under these
circumstances, no liability can be found unless professional standards
place the attorney under some duty. Whether this duty exists and the
degree of care required to satisfy the duty in a given case ultimately
will depend on whether state or federal standards define an attorney's
obligations.
A. Theoriesfor Reaching Attorneys
Under the Securities Laws
Attorneys' professional standards have figured prominently in
two types of securities law proceedings. First, in SEC proceedings
brought under clause (ii) of rule 2(e) (1) of the SEC's Rules of Practice,
an attorney, who is judged to have acted improperly or unethically in
performing securities-related services, becomes susceptible to suspension or disbarment from SEC practice.' 7 Second, in proceedings
alleging violation of substantive provisions of the securities laws- typically the antifraud provisions, such as section 17(a) of the 1933 Secur-

16For cases involving liability of lawyers as principals, see, e.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing
Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (2d Cir. 1972); Katz v. Amos Treat & Co., 411 F.2d 1046 (2d Cir.
1969); United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 953 (1964);
Gottlieb v. Sandia Am. Corp., 304 F. Supp. 980 (E.D. Pa. 1969), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
452 F.2d 410 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 935 (1971).
17 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e) (1981). For the full text of rule 2(e)(1), see note 5 supra.
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ities Act 18 or section 10(b) of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act',,-an
attorney may be enjoined or held liable for damages or may, here too,
risk suspension or disbarment from SEC practice under clause (iii) of

rule 2(e)(1).
There isno mystery as to how professional standards become
involved in cases raising rule 2(e)(1)(ii) claims. Rule 2(e)(1) states that
the Commission may suspend or disbar an attorney from practicing

before it if he or she is found "(ii) to be lacking in character or
integrity or to have engaged in unethical or improper professional

conduct." 20 This is simply a generically stated, SEC-devised rule of
professional conduct and does not purport to promulgate independent
professional standards. The professional standards by which attorney
conduct is to be judged must be imported from some outside source.

15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976) reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities by the use of
any means or instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or
by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material fact
or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
19 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1976) reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors.
Section 10(b) is not self-executing and actions are generally brought for violations of rule lOb-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981), promulgated under the SECs § 10(b) rulemaking authority. The
rule reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact
necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under
which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.

17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(1)(i) (1981).
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Thus, although the rule itself is vague and ambiguous, 21 requiring
content from state or federal law, there is no ambiguity as to how
violations of standards relate to it.
Professional standards of conduct become implicated in cases
involving substantive provisions of the securities laws in a less direct
manner. The former general counsel for the Commission has described two theories used by the SEC to proceed against attorneys for
substantive securities law violations.2 2 An infrequently applied theory addresses the question whether "the lawyer directly violated a
provision of the federal securities laws? For example, did the lawyer
make a misstatement or involve himself in a conspiracy to violate the
law?" 2 3 More commonly, the SEC questions whether a lawyer, who
acted solely as a professional in a particular transaction, "should be
held derivatively or secondarily liable for the direct violations of
another." 24 In this case, the SEC requires a theory upon which to
hang the derivative claim. For example, if the lawyer is a control
person, then, unless he or she has a good faith defense, the SEC can
establish liability under section 20(a) of the '34 Act.2 5 More often,
however, the SEC attempts to establish the liability of the lawyer as

21 For an analysis of some of the ambiguities in the rule, see Marsh, supra note 5, at
993-1003.
The Second Circuit held the application of rule 2(e) to accountants valid in Touche Ross &
Co. v. SEC, 609 F.2d 570, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1979). However, the general validity of rule 2(e) as to
attorneys continues to be called into question. See Keating, Muething & Klekamp, SEC Exch.
Act Release No. 15,982, 17 SEC Docket 1149, 1157-63 (1979) (Karmel, Comm'r, dissenting);
Marsh, supra, at 1004-15; Michigan Note, supra note 7, at 1283. The SEC, in William R.
Carter, SEC Exch. Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC Docket 292, 293-98 (1981), upheld the
validity of the rule in a thorough analysis.
The scope of rule 2(e) is also the subject of some concern. See Marsh, supra, at 994 (pointing
out that although rule 2(e) refers to practice before the SEC, the staff, at least at that time,
defined this broadly to include securities law advice beyond dealings with the Commission). This
view may be changing. See Greene Speech, supra note 7, at 169.
22 Ferrara, Administrative Disciplinary Proceedings Under Rule 2(e), 36 Bus. Law. 1807,
1809-10 (1981).
23 Id. at 1809 (citing United States v. Benjamin, 328 F.2d 854 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 377
U.S. 953 (1964)); see note 16 supra.
24 Ferrara, supra note 22, at 1810. For a recent analysis of secondary liability under rule
10b-5, see Fischel, Secondary Liability Under Section 10(b) of The Securities Act of 1934, 69
Calif. L. Rev. 80 (1981). The article is written in an adversarial manner, advocating the
elimination of aiding and abetting liability.
25Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C, § 78t(a) (1976), reads:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any provision of
this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be liable jointly and severally
with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person to whom such
controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person acted in good faith and did not
directly or indirectly induce the act or acts constituting the violation or cause of action.
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an aider or abettor. To do this, it attempts to show that the attorney
substantially assisted the principal violator either affirmatively, such
as by drafting a false filing, or, as is more often the case, through
"failure to act in a derogation of a duty to do so." 20
The Commission has focused on professional standards in attempting to establish substantive violations based on claims against
attorneys for "substantial assistance" in aiding and abetting through
an act or omission. With respect to claims of affirmative assistance,
such as in the drafting of an alleged false document to be filed with
the SEC, the analysis is rather straightforward, with inquiry addressing the attorney's duties of diligence and skill.27 It is in cases arising
from an attorney's failure to act that the Commission has deviated
furthest from established standards of professional conduct to find
enforceable duties to press upon attorneys. For example, the Commission has attempted to establish secondary liability by using its socalled "access theory 281 to place a duty on attorneys to "blow the

Ferrara, supra note 22, at 1810. The author notes that when an attorneys breach of duty
is alleged an important issue will be whether that duty has been previously articulated, thus
giving the attorney fair warning. Id. at 1810.
The elements of an aiding and abetting cause of action under the securities laws are spelled
out in Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38, 4748 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1039 (1978). These appear to be based on the Restatement of Torts § 876(b) (1939) which reads:
"For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious conduct of another, one is liable If he...
(b)knows that the other's conduct constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or
encouragement to the other so to conduct himself .... "
21 E.g., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1029-30 (24 Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950
(1979); SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 809-10 (2d Cir. 1975): SECv.
Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 542 (2d Cir. 1973); Felts v. National Account Sys. Assn, 469 F.
Supp. 54, 67-68 (N.D. Miss. 1978).
's The SEC's "access theory" is premised on the role of lawyers in the marketing of securities.
Through their role in providing services for clients and advising them in various aspects of
securities transactions, such as in drafting registration statements and in providing opinions on
exemptions, attorneys are seen to provide the passkey into the marketplace for clients who buy or
sell securities. Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 79,631, at 83,689. The SEC believes that if lawyers
face potential liability for permitting clients to violate the securities laws, they wvill be more alert
to prevent such violations. The SEC made its belief express in Emmanuel Fields, 45 S.E.C. 262
(1973), aff'd, 495 F.2d 1075 (D.C. Cir. 1974), in which it focused on:
the peculiarly strategic and especially central place of the private practicing lawyer in the
investment process and in the enforcement of the body of federal law aimed at keeping
that process fair. Members of this Commission have pointed out time and time again that
the task of enforcing the securities laws rests in overwhelming measure on the bars
shoulders. These were statements of what all who are versed in the practicalities of
securities laws know to be a truism, i.e., that this Commission with its small staff, limited
resources, and onerous tasks is peculiarly dependent on the probity and the diligence of the
professionals who practice before it. Very little of a securities lawyes work is adversary in
character. He doesn't work in courtrooms where the pressure of vigilant adversaries and
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or to notify the board of directors of management's secur-

30
ities law violations.

B. The Duty Analysis
The juristic process involved in establishing the secondary liability of attorneys is the conventional duty analysis used to determine the
obligations of parties in tort actions. 3' Attorneys can be held liable
for their inaction relating to the substantive violations by principals
only if they can be found to have breached an obligation to act. Here,

professional responsibility standards will be incorporated into a duty
analysis to define, in part, the obligations under which attorneys act
in serving clients in securities-related matters. This conventional duty
analysis begins with the premise that a secondary actor can have a

duty either to warn a third party of the potential harm risked by the
principal actor's violations or to control the principal actor only if the

secondary actor shares with either the principal or the third party a
special relationship that will support such a duty. This is the analysis

proposed in the Restatement of Torts 32 and adopted generally by the

courts.

alert judges checks him. He works in his office where he prepares prospectuses, proxy
statements, opinions of counsel, and other documents that we, our staff, the financial
community, and the investing public must take on faith. This is a field where unscrupulous
lawyers can inflict irreparable harm on those who rely on the disclosure documents that
they produce. Hence we are under a duty to hold our bar to appropriately rigorous
standards of professional honor.
45 S.E.C. at 266 n.20; accord, Touche Ross & Co. v. SEG, 609 F.2d 570, 580-81 (2d Cir. 1979);
SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 536 (2d Cir. 1973). See generally William R. Carter, SEC
Exch. Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC Docket 292 (1981).
2' See SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 538 F.2d 404 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cort.
denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977).
'oSee William R. Carter, SEC Exch. Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC Docket 292, 320
(1981).
11 It is important to understand that "duty" is an elusive concept that gains definition from a
host of independent policy considerations. The California Supreme Court observed, to ask
whether a duty exists is merely to state the problem in an abstract way. Tarasoff v. Regents of
Univ. of Cal., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 434, 551 P.2d 334, 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 22 (1976). The court
noted, quoting W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts 325-26 (4th ed. 1971), that duty "Is
not sacrosanct in itself, but only an expression of the sum total of those considerations of policy
which lead the law to say that the particular plaintiff is entitled to legal protection." 17 Cal. 3d
at 434, 551 P.2d at 342, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 22.
32 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 314-320 (1965). Section 315 of the Restatement bars
the finding of a duty unless there exists either "(a) a special relation ... between the actor and
the third person, which imposes a duty upon the actor to control the third person's conduct, or
(b) a special relation . .. between the actor and the other which gives the other a right to
protection."
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Although Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States33 did not involve an issue of attorney's liability, it is perhaps the most familiar
illustration for securities lawyers of the need to establish a duty as a
prerequisite to liability. There, the Supreme Court determined that a
person acting as a market maker and soliciting buyers for securities
held by Indians had a duty as a fiduciary to disclose to the Indians the
market value of the shares sold. 34 More recently, the Supreme Court
employed the duty analysis in Chiarella v. United States,3 S finding
that an employee of a financial printer hired by a takeover company
owed no duty to the tender offer target's shareholders to refrain from
using sensitive inside information to purchase securities and therefore
could not be held liable for alleged violation of rule lOb-5. 3 In each
case, the Court stressed that a duty to disclose is premised on the
confidence between the defendexistence of a relationship of trust and
37
ant and one of the relevant parties.
To gain a perspective on how codes of professional responsibility
become incorporated into a duty analysis relating to substantive securities law violations by attorneys, we may consider briefly the National Student Marketing case. 38 There, the SEC brought an action
in the District of Columbia seeking an injunction under rule lOb-5
and other antifraud provisions of the federal securities acts39 against
two merging corporations and various individual defendants including the lawyers representing the corporations. One of the corporations, National Student Marketing Corporation (NSMC), was organized under Delaware law, and the other, Interstate National Corp.
(INC), under Nevada law. Their attorneys practiced in New York and
Chicago, respectively. The SEC alleged that the corporations issued a
misleading joint proxy statement to solicit their shareholders' approval
of the merger. The statement included an interim income statement of

- 406 U.S. 128 (1972).

4 Id. at 152-54.
- 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
3 Id. at 232-33.
37Id. at 228; 406 U.S. at 152.
A recent Second Circuit opinion indicates that a person in the position of the printer in

Chiarella may be held liable under rule 1Ob-5 on the basis of a duty owing to the printing
company and the takeover company. United States v. Newman, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed.

Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)

98,332 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981) (employees of investment banking firm

owed duties to their employer and to its client takeover companies).
38 SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 6S2 (D.D.C. 1978); see note 4
supra.
Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, §§ 13(a), 14(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(a), 78n(a) (1976).
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NSMC which showed a profit of $700,000. After successful proxy
solicitations and shareholders' meetings, the attorneys and certain

officials of each corporation were advised by the NSMC auditors'

"comfort letter" at the closing that in fact NSMC had suffered a loss of
$80,000 for that interim period. The SEC charged in its complaint

that under these circumstances both sets of attorneys had duties not
only to withdraw certain opinion letters required by the merger contract, but also "to insist that the financial statements be revised and
shareholders be resolicited, and failing that, to cease representing
their respective clients and, under the circumstances, notify the...
[SEC] concerning the misleading nature of the [interim statements]."40

To determine whether these invocations of a duty by the SEC are
valid we must consider the nature of the relationship of the attorneys
to the alleged principal violators of rule 10b-5-the management of
either corporation-and to the injured third parties-the corporate
shareholders. 41 A finding that the appropriate special relationship
existed would support the SEC's claim that the attorneys were under a
duty requiring them to control the management or protect the shareholders from management and would justify holding the attorneys
liable for breach of that duty. For example, if the INC lawyers are
held to have had a duty to control the INC management's conduct
through their relationship to management or to protect the INC shareholders because of their relationship to shareholders, then attorneys
42
will be liable for a breach of that duty.

40 NSM Complaint, supra note 4,

93,360, at 91,913-17.
41 Some may suggest that under its access theory the SEC could argue that an attorney's
membership in the SEC bar establishes a special relationship to the SEC supporting a duty, or
that, alternatively, the attorney's special relationship to corporate clients warrants the finding of
a duty to ensure against injury to SEC enforcement policies. It is hard to say, however, that there
is an "SEC bar," given 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (1976), which prohibits the establishment of such a
bar.
42 The lawyer's duties doubtless will vary with the circumstances of each case, just as do
directors' duties. See, e.g., Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d 1277, 1306-09 (2d Cir. 1973) (on
bane) (outside directors who were unaware of false representations and had not participated In
the merger negotiations were held to have had no duty to inquire and convey information to
prospective stock purchasers). The same directors were held liable for breach of duty In different
circumstances in Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 687-92 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
The court in National Student Marketing never reached the question of what specific duties
might be imposed on the attorneys. As to the INC attorneys in particular, the court held merely
that they should have done something to forestall the merger. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682, 714, 716-17 (D.D.C. 1978). NSMC's counsel, meanwhile, reached
a prior settlement with the SEC promising to "adopt, effectuate and maintain certain procedures
. . . in matters involving the Federal Securities Laws." SEC v. National Student Marketing
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The attributes of a special relationship necessary to support the
finding that the attorneys in National Student Marketing had a duty
will be determined by relevant considerations of policy; duty is always
a flexible concept whose existence depends on whether considerations
of policy lead to the conclusion that43a party should be held responsible
for the injury resulting to another.
Several factors promise to be particularly relevant to a court's
determination of whether an attorney's relationship to shareholders or
management creates a duty to shareholders, the breach of which will
support a finding that the attorney violated a substantive provision of
the securities laws. First are the relevant policies underlying the federal securities laws. Under its access theory, the SEC seeks to enhance
its ability to enforce the securities laws by holding attorneys to a duty
to police their clients' disclosure to the public and to the SEC. 44 The
SEC's belief is that this would provide greater assurance that the
public receives sufficient and accurate
information upon which to
45
make informed investment decisions.
Also relevant to a determination of a duty and of subsequent
substantive violations are expressions of legislative policy and the
allocation of corporate powers and fiduciary duties found in applicable state corporation codes. For example, a court could readily conclude that a corporation code's allocation of power solely to the directors to make a particular decision forecloses placing a duty to disclose
to shareholders on an attorney, unless the board is disqualified by a
conflict of interest from representing the corporation and the attorney
has knowledge of the facts that would give the shareholders an action
against the directors. 40 Thus, a court might find no obligations on
attorneys if a fully informed, disinterested board validly exercises its
power to act without a shareholders' vote in a short-form merger and

Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,027, at 91,601 (D.D.C.
1977).
This Article is not concerned with the specific duties of attorneys in securities transactions,
but with what source of law should be used to define that duty.
43See note 31 supra.
4See note 28 supra.
45See William R. Carter, SEC Exch. Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC Docket 292, 297-9S,

322-23 (1981); SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed.
See. L. Rep. (CCI) 96,027 (D.D.C. 1977).
46See Sehoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 196S) (en bane), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 906 (1969); Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968); cf. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v.
Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (in fraud action involving an alleged -take out- of minority

shareholders by a short-form merger under Delaware law, the Court explicitly held the state
corporation law as controlling internal corporate affairs).
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approves the merger after considering material adverse facts concern-

ing the merger partner. 47 Under these same circumstances, however,
an attorney who learns that the corporate president is making a secret

profit on the transaction might be held to have a duty, as the corporation's attorney, at least to inform the board.48

If the merger is a

long-form type, requiring a shareholder vote, as in National Student
Marketing, a court could find a duty to disclose to shareholders,
despite the board's knowledge and disinterest, depending on which
party the applicable corporation law identifies as the corporate client
for purposes of applying standards of attorneys' professional conduct

vis-h-vis that client. This reasoning shows that the attorney's responsibilities may be dependent in part on the underlying substantive rules

of the corporation law.
Codes of professional responsibility may also be highly relevant
to the determination of an attorney's duties under the securities laws.
These professional codes embody generally accepted resolutions of the
conflicting policies regarding professional conduct that courts are

likely to consider in making the duty analysis. The rules reflect the
long experience of their drafters in attempting to accommodate many
of the conflicting considerations. 49 These codes of professional conduct should be considered not only when they are incorporated into
statutes or court rules; codes adopted exclusively by professional societies such as local or national bar associations may also give rise to

enforceable duties. Moreover, duties may arise from standards developed through professional custom. 50

47See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
The American Bar Association Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards (the "Kutak" Commission) independently arrived at this same conclusion. See ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct rule 1.13, Legal Background 93 (proposed final draft May 30, 1981).
48 Cf. William R. Carter, SEC Exch. Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC Docket 292, 316-19
(1981) (to play a role in an activity known by the attorney to be "improper or illegal" would
result in disciplinary action).
19One vastly complicating problem here is the widespread disagreement as to the meaning
of the codes of professional responsibility and the even greater discord as to the direction of
change in this area of law. See [1980] Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 566, at AA-112 (a report of
the ABA August 1980 program of the Sections of Litigation and Corporation, Banking and
Business Law).
- See Morris, Custom and Negligence, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 1147 (1942). For a discussion of
limits on custom as a determinative guide for professionals in securities transactions, see United
States v. Simon, 425 F.2d 796, 805-08 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1006 (1970); Fflis,
Current Problems of Accountants' Responsibilities to Third Parties, 28 Vand. L. Rev. 31, 66-86
(1975).
For a survey of more general factors courts should consider in determining whether a duty to
protect third parties arises, see Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 113, 443 P.2d 561, 564, 70
Cal. Rptr. 97, 100 (1968).
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Another body of law that may be relevant to the determination
of an attorney's duties is that of agency and principal. If an attorney is
considered an agent of the corporation, as has been suggested by the
Kutak Commission, 3 ' then he or she owes primary duties not to corporate officers, who are also agents, but to the entity. Such a determination would cause a definition of duties that differs significantly from
that which many have urged as appropriate when an officer confides
some wrongdoing to the attorney.52
Finally, a court should find relevant to the determination of an
attorney's duties the duties implicit in various evidentiary rules of
attorney-client privilege, 53 the materiality of the undisclosed information, r the extent to which the attorney profited from the transaction, 55 and the nature of his or her participation.
Manifestly, in this duty analysis, a crucial question will be
whether, in determining these federal law duties, lower courts and
the SEC must adopt state law as a matter of federal law, or, instead,
may make federal common law determinations unhindered by state

"' The ABA's analysis of rule 1.13 of its proposed Model Rules of Professional Conduct
applies agency principles to resolve the question of conflict between the lawyfes professional
judgment and that of an officer or employee of the corporate client. See ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct rule 1.13, Legal Background 90-92 (proposed final draft May 30, 1981). It
would seem that these agency principles applied here -smell of the lamp" and should not be
relied upon as other than persuasive analogy. Corporate structures are sui generis. They are
inanimate entities acting through boards of directors which, regardless of what scholars might
think, do not function as principals directing the president and other officers as agents. In
practice, if anyone is the "boss," it is the chief executive officer (CEO). Business executives would
find stultifying a legal rule that treated the CEO and corporate counsel as co-agents.
52 Id.
' An attorney-client privilege will come into play only rarely in a duty analysis, for, in most
situations involving the alleged participation of an attorney in substantive securities violations,
the client will not have communicated confidences necessary to invoke the privilege in seeking
legal advice. See 8 J. Wigmore, Evidence § 2292 (rev. ed. J. MeNaughton 1961 & Supp. 19S0).
Moreover, in a shareholder action, it is doubtful that any privilege could be asserted since, under
most state corporation codes, shareholders are entitled to inspect the corporate books and
records. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 220 (1974); N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 624 (McKinney 1963
Supp. VI 1981). This shareholder right to inspect would apply even if the state law limits that
right to a "proper purpose." Id. The federal proxy rules clearly compel disclosure of interim data
to shareholders. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-9, .14a-1O1 (Item 14(b)(7)) (1981). The right of shareholders to receive information concerning the company may also override certain duties of
attorneys arising from professional codes to maintain client secrets. See Garner v. Wolfinbarger,
430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971); ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility Canon 4 (1980); id. Disciplinary Rule 4-101.
'4 See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
-5 Cf. Brennan v. Midwestern United Life Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966)
(issuer profiting from a broker's misrepresentation to investors held to have a duty either to
control the broker's action or to warn investors), motion to dismiss denied, 286 F. Supp. 702
(N.D. Ind. 1968), affd, 417 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1969). cert. denied, 397 U.S. 9S9 (1970).
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rules., 6 The determination of which source of law supplies the fed-

eral rule will direct the amount of weight to be given to each of the
factors identified above in defining an attorney's duty. In National
Student Marketing, for example, the court, in determining the INC
attorneys' duties, had to decide whether to (1) apply state law to
govern the attorneys' obligations or (2) ignore state law and apply a

federal rule not tied to that state's law. In either case, the court would
be applying federal law, but under the first alternative that federal
57

law would obtain its content by adoption of state law standards.
Incidentally, if the adoption alternative applies, a further question arises-which state's law shall be adopted when there are contacts with two or more states. The facts in National Student Marketing, involving contacts in at least four states and the District of

Columbia, illustrate poignantly the degree of complexity that is likely
to inhere in such a determination. Presumably, this second choice-of-

law question is to be decided as a matter of federal policy, rather than
by the law of the state in which the forum court sits, as would be
required in Erie-type cases in which the substantive law questions are
also regulated by state law. 5

" An important difference between formulation of a uniform rule and adoption based on
state contacts is that ultimately a uniform set of federal rules could emerge under the former
approach, thereby eliminating variations in legal standards in federal question cases and also
eliminating the need to litigate the choice-of-law question, see note 58 infra, as each case came to
court. Of course, the dynamics of the federal court system make it unlikely that a uniform set of
adjudicated rules will ever fully emerge in this context. See Mishldn, The Variousness of
"Federal Law": Competence and Discretion in the Choice of National or State Rules for
Decision, 105 U. Pa. L. Rev. 797, 813 (1957). Nevertheless, because the ABA continues to take
the leadership in the development of a model code of professional responsibility, and federal
courts are likely to give great weight to its formulations, there is a greater probability that a
fairly uniform body of law will develop even on a case-by-case basis and If federal courts decide
that the adoption of state law on a contacts basis is inappropriate.
- It may be urged that with respect to determining attorneys' duties under the federal
securities laws, the adoption alternative is not applicable. One asserting such a position would
claim that, unlike issues of procedure, such as the proper statute of limitations on an Implied
right of action, or of corporation law, such as the powers of an impartial board of directors, here
the issue merely involves interpretation of the substantive statutory provision of the federal
securities laws. This claim would find support in two recent Supreme Court cases that analyzed
duty without mention of state law. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); Affiliated
Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). However, as the analysis that foUows seeks to
demonstrate, the trend in recent Court decisions favoring adoption of state law, combined with
the strong interest states traditionally have in defining standards of professional conduct, should
cause the courts to define attorneys' duties in securities matters through the adoption of applicable state law.
-" Neither Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), nor Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Ele. Mfg.
Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941) (on issues governed by Erie, a federal court must observe the choice-oflaw rules of the state in which it is located), governs the choice of which state's law to borrow as
a matter of federal law. Rather, the decision should be made according to federal choice-of-law
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II
THE ADOPTION ANALYSIS

When a federal law fails to define adequately the terms it uses, a
court, charged with construing that law, may derive the necessary
meaning from relevant state law. Clearly, under such circumstances,
the state law chosen does not operate of its own force; rather, it is
adopted as a matter of federal law. For example, in Reconstruction
Finance Corp. v. Beaver County5 9 the Supreme Court approved the
use of state law to determine whether machinery constituted "real
property" in a poorly articulated federal statute that established a
United States-owned corporation to aid business in constructing defense plants during World War II and permitted the states to tax the
"real property" of the corporation."0 More recently, in Burks v.
Lasker,61 the Court held that state law should be adopted as federal
law to determine whether a committee of directors of a corporation
had the authority to discontinue a shareholders' derivative suit that
asserted a federal right of action against that corporation. 62
State law is not always invoked to fill the interstices left in federal
law, however. For example, in ClearJield Trust Co. v. United
States,63 the most famous case in point, the Court found use of state
law inappropriate to determine whether an unreasonable delay in
notifying a guarantor that a check issued by the United States bore a
forged endorsement would provide a defense in a suit brought by the
United States to recover on the guaranty. The Court reasoned that
efficient regulation of the federal interests involved required a single
rule that would be applied uniformly throughout the country." The
Court feared the disparate results risked by application of fifty different state standards. 5 Hence, the Clearfield Trust result may be

standards. Cf. Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Int'l Union v. Mobil Oil Corp., 426 U.S. 407

(1976) (choice of state law to be adopted to control right to work under federal statute made
without reference to Erie or Klaxon). See also Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653

(1979) (treaty setting interstate boundary governed the issue of which states law must be
adoptedby federal courts).'Hence, the choice of which state law will be borrowed in a particular
case presumably will be left to federal policy.
- 328 U.S. 204 (1946).
6 Id. at 210.
61

441 U.S. 471 (1979).

62 Id. at 486.
318 U.S. 363 (1943).
61 Id. at 367.

6 Id.
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referred to as the "uniformity" result, or as the "uniform federal rule"
principle, and the result typified by the Beaver County/Burks v.

Lasker decisions may be referred to as the "adoption" result.
Clearly, the question whether to apply state or federal standards
to determine an attorney's duties in performing securities-related services for clients will be resolved by deciding whether to follow the
"uniformity" result or the "adoption" result. What criteria apply to
determine when state law should be adopted as a matter of federal
law and when, instead, a uniform federal rule should be fashioned?
Until recently, the standards for making this determination were
difficult to ascertain. In the past few years, however, the Supreme
Court has begun to fashion a coherent technique for analyzing the
question.

In undertaking this adoption analysis, we should keep in mind
that we are analyzing the requirements of the federal securities laws
as to an attorney's professional responsibility and, therefore, the command of the Erie doctrine, that state law be applied as the rule of
decision, does not arise. 66 Under Wallis v. Pan American Petroleum
Corp.,67 federal courts must go beyond a mere determination that
some federal statute, treaty, or constitutional provision affects the

activity at issue before concluding that Erie does not control and
application of a federal rule is warranted.0 8 That requirement is
clearly satisfied here. The federal securities statutes manifest a sufficiently strong federal interest to take the case outside the Erie rule.00

"

Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Under Erie, cases brought in federal court that
do not raise a federal question-i.e., a question arising under a federal statute or treaty or the
Constitution-must be decided through application of the appropriate state law. Id. at 78.
-1 384 U.S. 63 (1966).
61 Id. at 68-69.
69 The mere fact that some federal legislation, treaty, or constitutional provision Is related to
the controversy is not enough to avoid the requirements of Erie. See, e.g., id. at 69 (federal
regulation of railroads did not make personal injury claim against railroad company a federal
question avoiding the requirement to apply state law). The issue we are addressing here,
however, not only relates to a federal statute, but arises under one. The source of the federal
basis for a decision removing a case from the Erie doctrine is not always explicit. See, eg.,
Nebraska v. Iowa, 406 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1972) (state law rejected and federal law applied to
resolve a boundary dispute between two states despite the absence of an express federal statutory, treaty, or constitutional provision giving rise to a federal question). In the area of attorneys'
duties under the securities laws, however, direct federal statutory and regulatory law provide the
federal basis for removing the question from Erie; there is no question that the issue arises under
federal and not state law. For recent discussions of the inapplicability of Erie to cases requiring
adoption analysis but arising under federal statutes or regulations, see United States v, Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 726-27 & n.19 (1979); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co.,
412 U.S. 580, 592-93 (1973).
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What we are concerned with here is a second problem addressed
in Wallis-whether, after finding a sufficient federal interest to invoke federal law, that federal law should comprise a uniform federal
rule or a rule adopted from the law of an appropriate state. In making
that determination, the Wallis Court indicated that it would be necessary to consider further "the strength of the state interest in having its
own rules govern,

...

the feasibility of creating a judicial substitute,

... and other71similar factors."' 70 It is this second problem to which

we now turn.

A. The Adoption Issue Generally
Nearly a quarter century ago, Paul Mishkin explained the process
courts used to decide whether to adopt state law as the federal rule of
decision. 72 Borrowing from the insights of Hart and Wechsler, 73 he
noted that the principal explanation for federal adoption policy was
the nature of federal lawmaking; while state legislatures legislate
against the background of judge-made law, Congress legislates against
the background of state law-both legislative and judicial.74 This
state law background, he found, helped guide courts in their attempts
to fill the interstices left by Congress in federal statutes. 75
The adoption issue does not arise when Congress expresses its
intent, either directing the courts to apply state law-as in the Federal
70Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68-69 (1966) (citations omitted).
Because the Court found Erie controlling, it did not have to engage in this more detailed

analysis.
7' A separate question, which this Article does not address, is whether, on the basis of the
supremacy clause, the existence of federal securities laws preempts application of state law in this
area. Under the preemption doctrine, an entire field of law is declared exempt from state
regulation. See, e.g., Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299,319 (1851). In Rice v.
Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947), the Court stated that preemption is a
question of congressional purpose and that it will arise when federal regulation in the area is
especially "pervasive," when the federal interest is particularly dominant, or when the state
policy could produce results inconsistent with the federal objective.
The questions arising from inconsistencies of state and federal interests in regulating attorneys are relevant to both preemption and adoption issues. The courts are particularly loathe to
find preemption, however, "unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.- id., or
"the nature of the regulated subject matter permits no other conclusion," Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). For our purposes we make the entirely
reasonable assumption that Congress did not intend that the securities laws preempt state
regulation of professional responsibility.
72 Mishldn, supra note 56, at 810-14.
'3 Id. at 811; see P. Bator, P. Mishldn, D. Shapiro & H. Wechser, Hart & \Ve sler's The
Federal Courts and the Federal System 470-71 (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter Hart & Wechsler].
-' For a modem confirmation of Mishldn's assertion, see City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451
U.S. 304, 316 (1981).
75 Mishkin, supra note 56, at 812-14.
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Tort Claims Act 76 -or, as is more often the case, expressly supplying
a uniform substantive rule. 77 In these cases, no judicial inquiry as to

the choice between a uniform federal rule and an adopted state law is
required. However, when Congress does not so clearly express its will,
courts must make the choice-of-law decision. To a great extent this
choice involves inferring legislative intent, or more accurately, implementing perceived legislative policy. As the Court has recently stated:
"[I]n fashioning federal principles to govern areas left open
by Con' 78
gress, our function is to effectuate Congressional policy.
In implementing congressional policy, courts should be cognizant
of the state law backdrop against which Congress drafts its statutes.

Mishkin noted that "all the indicators of 'legislative intent' generally
employed in such an inquiry, including the broad historical pattern of

legislative development in the area," are relevant to the determination
of congressional policy. 79 Clearly, one factor that is highly relevant
to such an inquiry is the degree to which states traditionally have
regulated the subject matter that is encompassed and left ambiguous
in the federal legislation at issue. For example, when Congress enacts

a law concerning a person's "child," courts could presume that it
intended to adopt long-standing state law definitions to resolve such
questions as whether illegitimate children are to be included.80 And
when courts imply a cause of action, they may also infer a congressional intent to have the appropriate state statute of limitations ap-

ply. 8"' Thus, Justice Jackson, in D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. Federal

76 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2672, 2674 (1976).

Other statutes expressly direct courts to adopt state law to resolve various federal law issues.
E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976) (requiring application of state law in § 1983 actions when federal
law provides no rule of decision); see Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 484-86 (1980)
(relying on § 1988 to apply state statute of limitations). See generally Mishkin, supra note 56, at
797 n.1 (providing other examples).
77 E.g., Boulder Canyon Project Act, 43 U.S.C. § 617c(a) (1976) (providing for apportionment among states of water from Colorado River); see Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 560
(1963) (relying on Act to reject state's water rights claim based on state law); cf. Sunderland v.
United States, 266 U.S. 226, 232-33 (1924) (acknowledging Congress' power to displace state law
by imposing restrictions on alienation of Indian property despite the exclusive control states
generally exercise over the control and disposition of real property).
78 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 738 (1979).
7' Mishkin, supra note 56, at 811.
" See DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 581 (1956). See also United States v. Standard O11
Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309 (1947) ("In [some] situations it may fairly be taken that Congress has
consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests and
functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so governed.")
(footnote omitted).
SI See UAW v. Hoosier Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 703-05 (1966).
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Deposit Insurance Corp., 82 noted that even in cases in which the
statute is silent, congressional intent may be presumed from the milieu
in which the statute was drafted:
I hardly suppose that Congress intended to set us completely adrift
from state law with regard to all questions as to which it has not
provided a statutory answer. An intention to give persuasive or
binding effect to state law has been found to exist in a number of
cases similar in that they arose under a law of the United States but
were not governed by any specific statutory provision. 83
The task of divining legislative intent or policy, however, is not a
clear-cut exercise. It is widely recognized that determining legislative
intent is one of the more elaborate chimeras of the law and may be
more a technique for rationalizing judicial policy than for discovering
a legislative norm. 4 Judge Friendly describes the exercise of imputing congressional intent to apply state law. "The issue that must be
determined in each instance is what heed Congress intended to have
paid to state law.. .- more realistically, in Gray's famous phrase, 'to
guess what it would have intended on a point not present to its mind,
if the point had been present."' 8 5 Indeed, the Supreme Court has
recognized that situations arise in which there is no discernible legislative policy to be implemented and that some judicial policy must be
invoked to decide whether state law should supply the content for
unspecified federal law. 86

82 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
8 Id. at 473-74 (concurring opinion).
4 See, e.g., Corry, The Use of Legislative History in the Interpretation of Statutes, 32 Can.
B. Rev. 624, 629-32 (1954); Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 863, 869-81

(1930); Smith, Legislative Intent: In Search of the Holy Grail, 53 Calif. St. B.J. 294, 301 (1978).
But see Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline Method, 3 Dalhousie L.J. 333, 347-48

(1976) (arguing that legislative intent, while not talismanic, can aid in determining the general
purposes of a statute); Landis, A Note on "Statutory Interpretation," 43 Hare. L. Rev. 8S6,
888-93 (1930) (a reply to Radin, supra).

95 Friendly, In Praise of Erie-and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. Rev.
383, 410 (1964).
8 In United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947), the Court took occasion to
elaborate on its reasons for adopting state law in certain instances:
It is true, of course, that in many situations, and apart from any supposed influence of
the Erie decision, rights, interests and legal relations of the United States are determined
by application of state law, where Congress has not acted specifically. -In our choice of

the applicable federal rule we have occasionally selected state law."'.... The Covernment,
for instance, may place itself in a position where its rights necessarily are determinable by

state law, as when it purchases real estate from one whose title is invalid by that law in
relation to another's claim. In other situations it may fairly be taken that Congress has
consented to application of state law, when acting partially in relation to federal interests
and functions, through failure to make other provision concerning matters ordinarily so
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Until very recently, this judicial policy, used to decide whether to
fill interstices left in federal legislation with a federal or state rule, has
lacked a coherent rule that could guide consistent decisionmaking on

the adoption issue. Rather, various factors in the contemporary decisionmaking environment, the most important of which was the prevalent judicial attitude toward federalism, caused nonuniformity in
judicial precedent. This pattern becomes manifest through review of

some of the early Supreme Court decisions addressing the adoption
issue.
Even during the pre-Erie reign of Swift v. Tyson,8 7 federal courts

deferred to state rules to regulate limited issues of a "local" nature,
such as those involved in real property or family relations. Courts
acknowledged in these cases the strong state governmental interest in
regulating these issues and the relatively weak federal interest traditionally attaching to the subject matter in question. 88 In other areas
governed. And in still others state law may furnish convenient solutions In no way
inconsistent with adequate protection of the federal interest.
Id. at 308-09 (quoting from Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)).
More recently, in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 672 (1979), the Court acknowledged that "[w]hether to adopt state law or to fashion a nationwide federal rule is a matter of
judicial policy." The Court cited for support Hart & Wechsler, supra note 73, at 768, in which
the authors noted that: "The federal 'command' to incorporate state law may be a judicial rather
than a legislative command; that is, it may be determined as a matter of choice of law, even In
the absence of statutory command or implication ...."
The rationale underlying both the legislative and judicial policies, equally compelling for
both lawmaking agencies, must be that accommodation of state interests, when not upsetting to
federal interests, is more socially desirable than ignoring state interests. Indeed, this policy of
accommodating state interests may be implicit in the federal system designed by our Constitution; thus, just as Erie is probably constitutionally compelled, see Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304
U.S. 64, 80 (1938) ("in applying the doctrine [of federal common law] this Court and the lower
courts have invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the several
States."); Friendly, supra note 85, at 394-98, so too, adoption of state law may be constitutionally compelled, absent congressional expression of a federal rule. Alternatively, the courts may
be compelled by the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976) (corresponds to Judiciary Act
of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 92), to adopt state rules absent a congressional choice. See text
accompanying notes 147-48 infra. But see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-04
(1945) (Rules of Decision Act does not limit authority of federal government to make law);
Westen, After "Life for Erie"-A Reply, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 971, 982-89 (1980). (Rules of Decision
Act contains no independent limit on courts' power to fashion federal common law).
17 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
1 United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973) ("Even when
federal general law was in its heyday, an exception was carved out for local laws of real
property"); see Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U.S. 349, 357-60 (1909); Bucher v. Cheshire
R.R., 125 U.S. 555, 584 (1887); Burgess v. Siligman, 107 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1882).
Post-Erie cases continue to defer to state rules under ambiguous federal law to regulate
matters traditionally of local concern. See Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand &
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977) (property law); United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966)
(domestic relations); Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946) (property
law).
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of law, however, where state interests did not enjoy such a tradition,
courts were far more reluctant to adopt state standards.
To illustrate, in the Clearfield Trust 89 decision, written soon
after Erie and on the rising tide of national power, the Court set a
federal tone for subsequent decisions in two respects: (a) it opted for a
uniform federal rule as a good thing in and of itself; and (b) it did so
without due regard for the relevant state interests.6 0 Mishkin preceded numerous commentators in criticizing both aspects of Clearfield

Trust:
The importance of uniformity in relation to a particular issue may
at times be clearly settled by careful analysis of the given problem-particularly when it is viewed against its legislative background. But more often, perhaps, the force attributed to it in fact
depends upon assumptions, only rarely articulated, about our federal system. Thus, not infrequently the call for "uniformity" seems
basically to represent a desire for symmetry of abstract legal principles and a revolt against the complexities of a federated system of
government. Under such circumstances, the importance assigned to
this argument in fact incorporates an implicit judgment about the
relative value of federalism. The same point seems to apply more
generally as well. Many other factors also contain implicit judgments on the questions of distribution of power between national
and state governments. So long as these underlying considerations
are not articulated, it is fairly easy, in these days of increasing
reliance on and attention to our central government, to underestimate the importance of the states and the accompanying diversity
and diffusion of power.9'
We shall see that Mishkin's suggestions seem to have taken hold
in recent Supreme Court decisions.92 Certainly the first difficulty
with Clearfield Trust, involving the overly solicitous regard given to
the concept of a uniform federal rule, has been overcome. 3 The
Court now requires a far more complete analysis of the underlying
federal interests before it will find a "uniform" federal rule neces-

Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943).

o0 Id. at 366-67. Although the Court aclmowledged that federal law may employ state law in
some situations, it concluded without discussion that adoption would be inappropriate in this

case. Id. at 367.
91 Mishin, supra note 56, at 813-14; see Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 Harv. L. Rev.
1512, 1529-31 (1969).
'2 See text accompanying notes 116-57 infra.
See, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979). But see Carlson
v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 48-49 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
13
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sary.9 4 The analysis employed by today's Court also requires that far

greater deference be given to state interests than was shown in Clearfield Trust and its initial progeny.95 The difference is one of the
degree of respect held for state interests. Unlike the Court's analysis in
Clearfield Trust, wherein one perceives an impatient, almost arrogant
attitude toward state interests, 6 today one finds embodied in Court

opinions an attitude of solicitude-a judicial perception that there is a
fundamental federal interest in seeking to accommodate
both federal
97
and state interests in fashioning the rule of law.

Thus, we shall see that the precedents call for an interest analysis, requiring courts to balance state and federal interests before
deciding whether to adopt state law as a matter of federal law. The
two changes in judicial attitude since Clearfield Trust, calling for
careful analysis of the need for uniformity and recognizing a national
interest in accommodating both state and federal interests, dictate the

main outlines of the interest analysis.
B. The Interest Analysis for the Adoption Issue

Almost immediately after Erie was decided, the Court, in Board
of County Commissioners v. United States, 8 made express its recogniSee, e.g., United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. at 727-30.
" See id. at 739-40.
" This criticism may seem unduly harsh if Clearield Trust is read narrowly, limiting It to Its
facts involving the protection of United States governmental proprietary interests in claims
brought by the United States. The tendency of courts and commentators to read the case
broadly, however, warrants this harsh epithet. See, e.g., Mishkin, supra note 56, at 813-14;
Note, The Federal Common Law, supra note 91, at 1529-31. But see Bank of Am.Nat'l Trust &
Say. Ass'n v. Rocco, 226 F.2d 297, 299 (3d Cir. 1955) (Clearfield not precedent when dispute
involves private parties and does not involve the rights and duties of the United States), rev'd sub
nom. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v. Parnell, 352 U.S. 29 (1956).
91Judge Wisdom, writing for the majority in Georgia Power Co. v. 54.20 Acres of Land, 563
F.2d 1178, 1188-89 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979), held that a federal rule
was required to regulate the matter in controversy, although he noted that the presumption In
favor of federal law, evidenced in early Supreme Court decisions, had been departed from in
later cases. Judge Simpson, writing in dissent, said, "[a] review of the Supreme Court's decisions
in this area reveals a far more certain direction than what the majority calls 'a changing
emphasis of factors and shifting preferences for one law or the other'." Id. at 1194. Three years
later, the majority opinion was overruled in an en bane opinion which, after reviewing Supreme
Court decisions, said the cases "do indeed evidence 'a growing desire to minimize displacement
of state law."' Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 936 (1981). Those who have been reared on contemporary social values
may find it difficult to understand that only a few years ago the zeal for centralized power far
exceeded in intensity today's interest in state power. This attitude is only partially illustrated by
phrases such as that of Judge Clark, who referred to the "trend of nationalism [that] was happily
developing in 1938." Clark, Federal Procedural Reform and States' Rights: To a More Perfect
Union, 40 Tex. L. Rev. 211, 220 (1961).
-- 308 U.S. 343 (1939).
94
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tion of the need to apply an interest analysis to resolve the adoption
question. The Court noted that in areas in which federal law continued to apply, but in which Congress had left undefined certain elements within the law, it would be necessary to analyze state and
federal governmental interests to determine whether the content of
the unspecified federal law should be a uniform rule or, instead,
should be borrowed from a state's law. In this case the issue arose in
deciding the right of the United States to recover interest on a judgment for illegally imposed tax payments made by an Indian to the
state of Kansas. The Court's analysis noted that Congress had left
resolution of this issue for judicial determination through the application of equitable principles including considerations of "public convenience." 99g The Court found that here due regard for local institutions and local interests was particularly appropriate, as states had
considerable interests in laws regulating Indian life within their territorial boundaries and these interests did not impinge on federal interests. As the Court observed: "the state law has [in the past] been
absorbed, as it were, as the governing federal rule not because state
law was the source of the right but because recognition of state
interests was not deemed inconsistent with federal policy." l00
It was Justice Rutledge, however, in United States v. Standard
Oil Co., 01 who first identified the main elements of the adoption
analysis that the Supreme Court now uses to decide adoption cases.
The case involved a claim by the United States against Standard Oil of
California for injuries caused by one of its employees to a soldier. The
government sought compensation for loss of services and costs of
treatment. After holding the matter to raise a federal question and
therefore to fall outside of Erie's governance,10 2 Justice Rutledge encapsulated the essential elements of the interest analysis:
[T)he answer to be given necessarily is dependent upon a variety of
considerations always relevant to the nature of the specific governmental interests and to the effects upon them of applying state law.
These include not only considerations of federal supremacy in the
performance of federal functions, but of the need for uniformity
and, in some instances, inferences properly to be drawn from the
fact that Congress, though cognizant of the particular problem, has
03
taken no action to change long-settled ways of handling it.1

9 Id. at 351-52.
100Id.

101332 U.S. 301 (1947).
102Id. at 305-09.
10

Id. at 310.
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Although this quotation portrays the then-prevalent preference
for federal law, with its deemphasis of state interests, it accurately
reflects the rudiments of an interest analysis. 10 4 That analysis re-

quires determination of the congressional policy, if any, concerning
choice-of-law, the federal governmental interests, the potential effect
on those interests risked by adoption of state law, the degree to which
federal supremacy applies, and the need for uniformity. Subsequent

decisions, including the most current ones, have relied on Standard
Oil as the touchstone for analyzing whether state law should be
adopted.1 0 5 However, the Court's tone in its most recent decisions

evidences a greater solicitude for state interests.108
The Court's analysis in Little Lake Misere Land Co. v. United

States10 7 seems to mark the turning point at which the Court came to
treat the accommodation of state interests in federal law as itself an
important federal interest. There, the Court considered whether to
adopt a Louisiana state statute to regulate the prescriptive rights of
the United States to oil, gas, and minerals on lands that it had obtained under grants that provided separately for those rights. Although in this case the Court found application of the state statute

inappropriate because it was enacted after the land grants in question
had taken effect, it acknowledged the strong interest of Louisiana in

preserving grantors' mineral rights so as to facilitate voluntary surface
conveyances to the United States.108 It implied in dicta that such an
interest, under appropriate circumstances, could carry sufficient

'0 Justice Rutledge did in fact give due consideration to the perceived state interest In the
deterrence of torts, but found that interest largely unrelated to enforcement of the statute since
adding United States' claims to the potential tortfeasor's liabilities would do little to enhance
deterrence. Id. at 310 & n. 14. Thus, he found the state interests insufficient to outweigh federal
interests and justify adoption. Id. at 310-11.
It should be noted that the Court did not purport to establish a rule, but only to develop a
framework for making the interest analysis of Jackson County. See text accompanying notes
98-100 supra. The Court stated, "we do not undertake to delimit or categorize the instances
where [state law] is properly to be applied outside the Erie aegis." 332 U.S. at 309.
105 E.g., Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653, 672 (1979); United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 727-28 (1979); United States v. Little Lake IvMisere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580, 594 (1973).
106 Again, if Standard Oil is read narrowly, confined to the acutely federal interest there
involved of injury to United States servicemen and compensation to the United States arising
therefrom, then inferences of a judicial indifference to state interests may be unwarranted, Cf.
Note, Tort Remedies for Servicemen Injured by Military Equipment: A Case for Federal
Common Law, 55 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 601 (1980) (noting the peculiarly federal interests raised by
injuries to servicemen).
107 412 U.S. 580 (1973).
108 Id. at 599.
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weight to justify the adoption of state law to govern conveyances
occurring 9 after enactment of the statute despite a differing federal
0
interest. 1
In this case, however, such a balance did not occur. The primary
importance of Little Lake Misere, for our purposes, lies in its demonstration of the need for care in balancing federal and state interests
and the need to preclude adoption of state law that risks defeating the
policies of the federal law. In the Court's principal holding it found
Louisiana's interests insufficient not on the issue of retroactivity, but
on the ground that its interests contradicted federal policy. It held
that "even assuming in general terms the appropriateness of 'borrowing' state law, specific aberrant or hostile state rules do not provide
appropriate standards for federal law.""10
At this point, the Supreme Court had set forth all of the elements
essential to an analysis of whether state law should be adopted as a
matter of federal law and had redirected lower courts toward greater
concern for state interests."' A perceptive student Note, published in
1976,112 considered this line of Supreme Court precedents and provided insights into the process of deciding the adoption issue.1 3 The
author found that prior cases suggested a two-step framework for
analysis:
First, a court should determine whether there is a conflict between
the state law and the federal program. If a conflict is found,
adoption of state law should be precluded. Second, if no conflict
exists, the state and federal interests involved should be balanced.
The federal interests to be considered at the second stage are the
need for uniformity and the avoidance of interference, not amounting to a conflict, with a federal program. The relevant state interests are preserving the structure of state regulation in areas of
traditionally local concern and avoiding
disruptive effects on the
14
operation of state law in other areas.
Court decisions since publication of this Note appear to have adhered
to such a process. A consideration of these opinions will show the
contours of this analysis as it is now applied by the Court.115
109Id. at 595, 599.
110 Id. at 595-96. The Court cited for support similar dicta in DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S.
570 (1956), and Reconstruction Fin. Corp. v. Beaver County, 328 U.S. 204 (1946).
1
See also Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975).
1
Note, Adopting State Law as the Federal Rule of Decision: A Proposed Test, 43 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 823, 824-26 (1976) [hereinafter Chicago Note].
"1 Id. at 830-43.
,,4 Id. at 843-44.
IS Mireev. DeKalb County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977), was the first decision, following the Chicago
Note, supra note 112, to raise the question whether state or federal law should control. The
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Justice Marshall, in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc.,110 provides the most fully articulated recent statement of the process by
which the choice-of-law determination is to be made. Kimbell Foods
presented two cases requiring adoption analysis. The first involved
whether a lien of the Small Business Administration (SBA) was to be
given priority over a private security arrangement. In this case, an
SBA loan, covered by a perfected security agreement, was made to a
supermarket after a private lender had entered into a security agreement with that supermarket, but before it had actually extended
credit. The issue of priority arose when the supermarket defaulted on
both loans.1 1 7 The second case raised a priority contest between a
federal contractual lien on a tractor and a private repairman's lien. 18
The first issue addressed in both cases was whether federal law
or, under Erie, state law was to provide the rule on priority. If the
federal law was to control, then the Court next had to decide whether
it should formulate a uniform federal rule or adopt state law as
federal law. Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, concluded that Erie did not control.119 He further held that although the
source of law was federal, a national rule was unnecessary to protect
20
the federal interests underlying the loan programs.1
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Marshall noted that under
prior decisions, most notably Little Lake Misere,'21 once the Court
found that federal interests were sufficiently implicated to "warrant
the protection of federal law,"'122 the first inquiry on the adoption
issue is whether applying the state rule in point would frustrate the
124
policy of the federal law;1 23 if so, the state rule will not be applied.
The Court apparently saw no such threat from the particular state

Court, however, treats this case not as raising the adoption issue, but as a diversity action
controlled by Erie, with the federal interests insufficient to warrant application of federal law.
433 U.S. at 33-34.
"- 440 U.S. 715 (1979). The Chicago Note, supra note 112, provides clarifying analysis useful
in understanding the Kimbell Foods opinion. Surprisingly, neither Kimbell nor the Chicago
Note receives its due approbation from subsequent Court decisions for its groundbreaklng
analysis.
117 440 U.S. at 718-20.
I'8 Id. at 723-24.
"9

120

Id. at 726-27.

Id. at 718.

121412 U.S. 580 (1973).
12 440 U.S. at 726-27.

Id. at 728.
The Chicago Note, supra note 112, at 843, had phrased this first issue in terms of "whether
there is a conflict between the state law and the federal program."
123
124

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

Nov.-Dec. 1981]

CHOICE OF LAW

laws at issue, relegating the point to a footnote reference.'2 It then
turned immediately to isolating the federal and state interests, continuing the analysis rudely outlined in prior cases.
In accordance therewith, the Court first considered whether,
under the circumstances presented by the cases, either an interest
calling for a uniform federal rule,126 or an interest in avoiding state
law that "would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs," 2 7 should control to preclude adoption. Next, the Court considered whether there was any relevant state interest in the matter.'
Justice Marshall performed this analysis and concluded that neither
federal interest was sufficiently weighty to control and that the state
29
interests were strong enough to justify adoption of the state rule.'1
In examining the federal interest in uniformity, the opinion followed recent precedent and did much more than ask whether uni30
formity should be established merely for the sake of uniformity.
Instead, the Court analyzed the question closely, stating that it was
compelled "to reject generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for
concrete evidence that adopting state law would adversely affect
administration of the federal programs."1 3 1 Although its analysis
leaves open the precise degree of administrative burden required to
justify formulation of a uniform federal rule, its stance on uniformity
itself is unmistakable. Unadorned pleas for uniformity or allegations
of administrative inconvenience arising from lack of uniformity,
standing alone, will not signal a sufficient federal interest to preclude
adoption of state law. Accordingly, the Court noted that the SBA
guaranteed loan program was already well adapted to "conform to

440 U.S. at 736 n.37.
Id. at 729-33.
Id. at 728, 733-38.

12
'2
'2
12s

Id. at 739-40.

The Court did not state its process so explicitly. Instead, it divided the opinion in three

parts, considering, in order, the need for uniformity, id. at 729, the inconsistency of state and
federal law, id. at 733, and the disruption of state interests, id. at 739.
The Chicago Note, supra note 112, suggests that the first step should be to determine
whether there is a direct conflict between the state and federal interests, the existence of which
results in immediate rejection of state law. The second step should then involve consideration of
the need for uniformity, and the potential inconsistency of the state rule with the federal rule
falling short of direct conflict. As the Note states, prior Supreme Court opinions had failed to
discriminate between "direct conflict" and "inconsistency" between state and federal policies.
Id. at 637. Kimbell Foods does seem to discriminate between the two, quickly finding no direct
conflict, 440 U.S. at 736 n.37, but discussing the issue of -inconsistency" at length, id.at 733-38.
'2 440 U.S. at 739-40.
,3Id. at 729-33.
131Id. at 730.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1236

each state's commercial standards."' 132 It concluded that "[s]ince
there is no indication that variant state priority schemes would burden

current methods of loan processing,

considerations of administra-

tive convenience do not warrant adoption of a uniform federal

rule." 133
As to the federal interest in avoiding "inconsistency" with the
objectives of the federal program, the Court looked first to the under-

lying policy of the SBA program and found it to be a form of social
welfare legislation designed to provide funds to small businesses that

could not otherwise obtain loans on reasonable terms. 34 The Court
then addressed the state law and concluded that the law would not
hinder the federal policy, although the law made it more difficult for
the government to collect on defaulted loans made under the program.

135

The final step in the interest analysis involved assessing the state
interest in regulating the subject matter invoked by federal policy and
balancing that interest against the federal interest in having a uniform
federal rule apply. 136

The Court identified a weighty state interest

Id. at 732.
133Id. at 733.
Im Id. at 735.
132

135 Id.

at 736 n.37. The Court concluded that Congress did not intend the costs of the federal

program to be borne by other creditors of the debtor. The Court placed in contrast federal tax
programs, in which the federal interest in collection of debts to the government was the primary
federal policy and state laws burdening collection would be inconsistent with that federal
interest. Id. at 735.
1M The Kimbell Foods opinion phrased the issue concerning state interest in terms suggesting
that such interests should be weighed against federal interests to determine the ultimate Issue of
adoption. Id. at 728-29. However, because the Court had already found no federal interest In
uniformity, id. at 733, and no evidence that state laws, if applied, would impair federal
objectives, id. at 738, it had no need to engage in balancing before it held that state law should
be adopted. Although it is possible that the Court would have found adoption of state law
precluded by the existence of federal interests, it is far more likely that, upon finding such
interests, the Court would have proceeded to balance them against those of the state. For If the
mere existence of a perceived "weighty" federal interest would preclude adoption, then the
Court's command to consider state interests in all cases would have no meaning. In fact, the very
logic of the situation would seem to call for balancing if state law ever is to be adopted, since In
every case held to invoke federal law under Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63
(1966), which requires more than a formal inquiry into the federal basis of law, there are, by
definition, federal interests of sufficient magnitude to foreclose adoption unless they can be
overcome by a weightier state interest. Cf. Georgia Power Co. v. 54.20 Acres of Land, 563 F.2d
1178, 1194 (5th Cir. 1977) (dissenting opinion) ("Because the decision is one of federal policy, It
will always be possible to identify some federal interest, and thus some conflict with state law
necessitating a choice. The key, as stated in Wallis, is that this conflict be 'significant.'")
(footnote omitted), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 907 (1979). The Chicago Note, supra note 112, at
846-48, also supports finding a balancing test implied in the Court's reasoning. It argues the
strengths of the balancing test over other possible alternatives by showing that If maxhnunm
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and adopted state law to decide the issue of priority. Subsequent cases
make it apparent that this valuation of the state interest involves more
than a rule of comity and more than the mere recognition of a state
interest. Giving due weight to state interests also fulfills a truly federal
interest in accommodating the interests of both state and federal
governments to the maximum extent137feasible without prejudicing the
accomplishment of federal policies.

In subsequent decisions, the Court has acted consistently with
Kimbell Foods. In Burks v. Lasker,138 the Court addressed the adoption issue in deciding what law should apply to resolve whether a
disinterested committee of a corporation's board of directors may vote
to terminate a shareholders' derivative suit brought as an implied
private right of action under the Investment Company Act 13 and the
Investment Advisers Act. 140 Although it did not expressly purport to
follow the Kimbell Foods-Chicago Note framework, the Court, in a
different sequence, addressed every element of that framework. First,

accommodation of state and federal interests is the fundamental objective of adoption, then
balancing achieves the best accommodation.
The Kimbell Foods Court's process leaves unanswered the resolution of a case in which all
three Kimbell Foodsquestions are answered negatively. That is, when there is no federal interest
in uniformity and the state rule would not impair the federal program, but there is also no state
interest, should a uniform federal rule apply or should the state rule be adopted? In Ceorgia
Power Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112 (5th Cir. 1980) (en bane), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 936
(1981), the Fifth Circuit provided one tentative answer.
It found the decision largely dependent on whether there is a presumption in favor of one or
the other law, and continued:
Basic considerations of federalism as embodied in the Rules of Decision Act, prompt
us to begin with the premise that state law should supply the federal rule unless there is an
expression of legislative intent to the contrary, or, failing that, a showing that state law
conflicts significantly with any federal interests or policies present in this case.
Id. at 1115-16.
'3 The Supreme Court recently made express its acknowledgement that a strong federal
interest in maintaining a viable federal system accompanies the interests of the states in having
their own laws govern matters encompassed in federal law. In Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446
U.S. 478 (1980), the Court stressed federalism concerns in its decision to adopt New York law:
We believe that the application of the New York law of tolling is in fact more consistent
with the policies of "federalism" invoked by the Court of Appeals, than a rule which
displaces the state rule in favor of an ad hoe federal rule.... Here New York has expressed
by statute its disfavor of tolling its statute of limitations for one action while an independent action is being pursued. Considerations of federalism are quite appropriate in adjudicating federal suits based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Younger o. Harris,401 U.S. 37
(1971). But the Court of Appeals' rule allowing tolling can scarcely be deemed a
...
triumph of federalism when it necessitates a rejection of the rule actually chosen by the
New York Legislature.
Id. at 491-92.
13 441 U.S. 471 (1979).

'1 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
140Id. § 80b-1 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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the Court found the state interest in having its corporation law govern
a peculiarly "local interest" akin to the state interest in family law.'41
It then disposed of the federal interest in uniformity. It gave a fuller
elaboration of the rationale for rejecting barren pleas for uniformity
than was given in Kimbell Foods, stating that
[t]he real concern... is not that state laws be uniform, but rather
that the laws applied in suits brought to enforce federal rights meet
the standards necessary to insure that the "prohibition of [the]
federal statute ..

not be set at naught ....

" The "consistency"

requirement .. guarantees 14that
state laws failing to meet these
2
standards will be precluded.
This clearly embraces the requirement to give close analysis to the
federal interest in uniformity established in Kimbell Foods.
Finally, the Court considered whether a potential direct conflict
or lesser inconsistency existed between state and federal rules.'43 The
Court clearly indicated that it would treat a direct conflict as a basis
for placing an absolute bar on adoption of the state rule. It reasoned,
however, that a slight inconsistency with the federal law would have
to be weighed against
the substantial interest of the state evidenced in
144
its corporation law.

"1

441 U.S. at 477-78. The Court already had determined that the cause of action was

federal, arising under the statutes, and that therefore Erie was not controlling. Id. at 476,
142 Id. at 479 n.6 (quoting Sola Elec. Co. v. Jefferson Co., 317 U.S. 173, 176 (1942)).
"I Although the Court treats the two types of conflict together, the language of the opinion
indicates recognition of the separate treatment each requires.
Although "[a] state statute cannot be considered 'inconsistent' with federal law merely
because the statute causes the plaintiff to lose the litigation," federal courts must be ever
vigilant to insure that application of state law poses "no significant threat to any Identifiable federal policy or interest ..
" And, of course, this means that "unreasonable," or
"specific aberrant or hostile state rules," will not be applied. The "consistency" test
guarantees that "[n]othing that the state can do will be allowed to destroy the federal
right," and yet relieves federal courts of the necessity to fashion an entire body of federal
corporate law out of whole cloth.
Id. at 479-80 (citations omitted).
144 Id. The Court did not actually discuss lesser inconsistencies in terms of balancing. The
opinion's language, however, see the last sentence quoted at note 143 supra, its well as the
Court's analysis in the remainder of the opinion, see 441 U.S. at 480-86, and Its reliance on cases
that recognize the need to balance state and federal interests, e.g., United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715 (1979); United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580
(1973); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63 (1966), indicate that the Court had
balancing in mind. Presumably, the Court found no need to address directly the Issue of
balancing since it found that state law was not inconsistent with federal policy and that, In fact,
Congress had impliedly intended state law to regulate the powers of independent directors. 441
U.S. at 484-85.
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The opinion is thus consistent with Kimbell Foods and can be
best understood in its light. 145 However, the Burks v. Lasker analysis
provides a more streamlined means for determining adoption than
does the Kimbell Foods approach. Under Burks, the Court determines
first whether state interests exist and then whether those interests
found to exist conflict with federal policies either directly or in the
form of lesser inconsistencies. This analysis subsumes in the consistency analysis the determination whether nonuniformity of state laws
violates a federal interest, and it also conditions the entire analysis on
46
an identification of a strong state interest.
This streamlined format, calling for adoption of not inconsistent
state law, is appealing not only for its simplicity but also because it
may be congressionally mandated. It has been suggested that the
Rules of Decision Act, 14 which requires the use of state laws in federal
courts when applicable, applies not only to diversity cases, as was held
in Erie, but also to cases in which federal law governs and Congress is
silent on the adoption issue. 148 Other cases referring to state law as a
I4 Securities lawyers,

dealing with cases in which an independent committee of the board of
directors votes to discontinue a federal action raised in a shareholders" derivative suit, often
assume that only one issue requires resolution-whether the state and federal interests are
inconsistent. This stems from a narrow reading of Burks which fails to recognize that it is but one
in a string of cases raising adoption issues subsequent to Kimbell Foods, see, e.g., Wilson v.
Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. 653 (1979), and that these cases compel the resolution of other
issues including the need for uniformity, the aberrance or hostility of the state rule to the federal
policy, and the relative weight of the federal and state interests. Read in Isolation, Burks may
plausibly be understood to foreclose adoption whenever state and federal interests are inconsistent. 441 U.S. at 477-80. However, because Burks cites to Kimbell Foods, id. at 477, and was
decided amid a string of cases that clearly reflect the Court's reliance on a balancing test, such a
reading would seem erroneous. This is perhaps one of the casualties of intensive specialization In
legal practice-securities lawyers apparently do not read non-securities opinions.
148 In this form, the analysis would be akin to that dictated by Congress in 42 U.S.C. § 19S3
(1976), which instructs courts to refer to state law in § 1983 actions when federal law provides no
rule of decision "so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States." See Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478 (1980)(analyzing the consistency
of a state no-tolling rule with the objectives of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976)).
147 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976) ("The laws of the several states except where the Constitution or
treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded
as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.").
148 Cf. Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 49 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ('As observed by
Mr. Justice Powell [in his concurring opinion], 'federal courts routinely refer to state law to fill
the procedural gaps in national remedial schemes.'... Indeed, the Rules of Decision Act would
seem ordinarily to require it."). See also Georgia Power Co. v. Sanders, 617 F.2d 1112, 1116 n.6
(5th Cir. 1980) (en banc) (citing other authority in support), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 936 (1931);
Note, Federal Courts-Choice of Controlling Law in Cases Invoving Federally Insured Mortgages, 49 N.C.L. Rev. 358 (1971); Note, Rules of Decision in Nondiversity Suits, 69 Yale L.J.
1428, 1446 (1960). But see Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 103-04 (1945); Westen &
Lehman, Is There Life for Erie After the Death of Diversity?, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 311, 365-73
(1980).
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"convenient" ready-made rule may also be better explained by this
streamlined version which looks first to whether a state interest exists
that is sufficiently weighty to prompt the state to establish rules
regulating the relevant subject matter. 149 It may indeed be the analysis of certain of the Justices. 50 In any event, even if the Rules of
Decision Act does not dictate which analytical framework is to be
used, presumably the Kimbell Foods form and the more streamlined
Burks form will yield the same outcome. There is, of course, the
possibility that the more complex form, giving express recognition to
an interest in uniformity, may cause a different focus, which, when
applied to particular fact patterns, may yield differing results.
The final Supreme Court opinion drawing on the Kimbell Foods
analysis, Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,'5 1 clearly establishes an
interest analysis that rejects unsupported pleas for uniformity and
values state interests as the appropriate means for deciding the adoption issue. This case involved a question of title to riparian land held in
trust by the United States under an Indian treaty. Although the treaty
placed the case under the aegis of federal law, the Court, following

Indeed, as in Erie, the Constitution may dictate that state rules be adopted when Congress
is silent, based on the requirements of its federal system. See note 86 supra.
149 See, e.g., United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 309 (1947); Board of County
Comm'rs v. United States, 308 U.S. 343, 351-52 (1939).
10 See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (Brennan, J.); Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe,
442 U.S. 653, 672 n.19 (1979) (White, J.); Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979) (Brennan, J.).
,5, 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
The only other case in point, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), similarly may be viewed
as consistent with Kimbell Foods, although its analysis does not track Kimbell Foods In detail.
The case involved a suit brought by the survivors of a federal prisoner whose death was alleged to
have resulted from violations of certain constitutional rights. The Court, per Justice Brennan,
found a uniform federal rule necessary to determine whether an implied private right of action
arising from violation of a constitutional right survives the death of a claimant. Id. at 23. The
Court's decision, when read narrowly, is not inconsistent in result or analysis with one that
would be reached under a detailed interest analysis. The federal government has a strong interest
in protecting constitutional rights and the states have relatively little interest in protecting the
defendant federal prison officials or the prison inmates who are placed in various states at the
discretion of federal officials. Id. at 23 n.ll. If the case is read broadly, however, disregarding
the specialized facts evoking a peculiarly federal interest, and concentrating on the general
structure of the Court's analysis, it evidences a throwback to the elliptical pre-Kimbell Foods
techniques of unsystematic analysis. The opinion seems to rest content with the assertion that
"only a uniform federal rule of survivorship will suffice to redress the constitutional deprivation
here alleged and to protect against repetition of such conduct." Id. at 23. This language contrasts
sharply with Kimbell Foods' rejection of "generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for
concrete evidence," United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979). It Is not
enough for the Court to state that it knows the need for uniformity when it sees It. Justice
Rehnquist brings to light this seeming failure in the majority's analysis when he asserts, "[tihe
Court articulates no solid basis for concluding that there is any interest in uniformity that should
generally be viewed as significant." 446 U.S. at 49 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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the Kimbell Foods analysis, held that state law should be adopted as
the federal rule of decision. 152 The Court found "little likelihood of
injury to federal trust responsibilities or to tribal possessory interests"
from adoption of state law, thus resolving both the direct conflict and
inconsistency elements. 53 It then noted that, "[t]his is also an area in
which the States have substantial interest in having their own law
resolve controversies such as these. Private landowners rely on state
real property law when purchasing real property .....

'

The opin-

ion further tracked the Kimbell Foods analysis, quoting its language
in rejecting " 'generalized pleas for uniformity as substitutes for
concrete evidence that adopting state law would adversely affect
[federal interests].' "155

The Court's use of this analytical approach, prior to citing and
describing Board of County Commissioners v. United States,1'5 may
indicate most strongly its support for the Kimbell Foods analysis.
Although County Commissioners supplied a closely similar fact pattern that might normally have been relied on as determinative, it
contained a much more rudimentary interest analysis which the Court
may have wished to avoid endorsing.'5
In summary, the adoption analysis relied on by the Supreme
Court provides a process for finding the maximum accommodation of
federal and state interests when federal law controls but no federal
rule has been specified. This process of accommodation may be described as follows:
When the federal interests underlying federal law would be totally defeated by observing the state interest through adoption of the

The Wilson Court reasoned:
[Kimbell Foods] advises that at this juncture we should consider whether there is need for
a nationally uniform body of lav to apply in situations comparable to this, whether
application of state law would frustrate federal policy or functions, and the impact a
federal rule might have on existing relationships under state law. An application of these
factors suggests to us that state law should be borrowed as the federal rule of decision here.
442 U.S. at 672-73.
153 Id. at 673.
154 Id. at 674.
135 Id. at 673. The Court's substitution of the words -federal interest" for those used in
Kimbell Foods, "administration of the federal program," makes even more clear the Court's
commitment to a balancing of interests. In this case, the Court found application of a uniform
rule particularly inappropriate to decide whether riparian land ownership had changed by
accretion or had not changed because sudden avulsion had altered the shoreline. It reasoned that
adopting the various state rules would "avoid arriving at one answer to the avulsive-accretion
riddle in disputes involving Indians on one side and possibly quite different answers with respect
to neighboring land where non-Indians are the disputants." Id. at 674.
156 308 U.S. 343 (1939); see text accompanying notes 98-100 supra.
"5 Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe, 442 U.S. at 674-75.
'5
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state rule, the federal interests will be given supremacy and a uniform
federal rule will be announced.1 58 If no direct conflict exists, a court
must then determine whether the federal interests, including any
interest in maintaining a uniform rule to effectuate underlying federal
policies, compete with identified state interests, in the sense that
adoption of the state rule would partially hinder the full implementation of the federal interest. If this lesser conflict is found to exist, the
court must measure the relative strengths of the federal and state
interests to determine whether adoption of the state rule or determination of a uniform federal rule would yield the maximum satisfaction of all interests. In the event that federal interests do not compete
with the state interests, the state rule should be adopted.15
C. InterstitialLaw as a More Appropriate Concept
than the Concept of Federal Common Law
Before we apply this interest analysis to the question whether to
adopt state rules of professional responsibility to regulate attorney
behavior under the federal securities laws, a spurious potential obstacle to that application should be eliminated. Much of the relevant
literature discusses the adoption issue in terms of "federal common
law." This label, "federal common law," invites controversy since the
term "common law" generally connotes judge-made law to the exclusion of statutory and constitutional interpretation. 10 Hence, one
might argue that there can be no application of the Kimbell Foods
analysis to a case, such as National Student Marketing, in which the
SEC seeks in an injunctive action to enforce the antifraud provision of
rule 10b-5 against an attorney pursuant to its express authority under
the 1934 Act. 61' Clearly such an argument would be erroneous.
02
Cases such as Reconstruction Finance Corp. v. Beaver County,

'8 See, e.g., Little Lake Misere Land Co. v. United States, 412 U.S. 580 (1973), discussed In
text accompanying notes 107-10 supra.
1-1 The Supreme Court's most recent statements regarding a federal court's power to compose
federal common law indicate even greater deference to state interests. In these cases, the Court
seems to move beyond requiring a mere balance of federal and state interests to establishing a
rebuttable presumption that absent a clear statement from Congress that a federal rule Is to

govern, courts are to apply state law. See Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S.
Ct. 2061, 2066-67 (1981); City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 101 S. Ct. 1784, 1792 (1981).
'6
See Hart & Wechsler, supra note 73, at 770.
161Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 21, 15 U.S.C. § 78u (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). In the
securities area, only implied private actions have become known generally as "federal common

law" cases.
162 328 U.S. 204 (1946).
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which adopted state law as a matter of federal law to define the term
"'real property" used in a federal statute, attest to the fact that adoption is appropriate in cases generally not regarded as involving "federal common law." The construct of "federal common law" is simply
inapposite as a threshold to adoption analysis. Rather, the crucial
factor that triggers the adoption inquiry is the existence of interstices,
caused by unspecified elements left in federal law, that require either
a state or federal rule to fill them. It is, therefore, advisable to discard
entirely the label "federal common law" and to view all cases with
interstices requiring adoption analysis as residing on a continuum
with variations existing only as to the breadth of the interstices needing to be filled.
This new, single concept of "interstitial lawmaking" is supported
by the nature of the lawmaking process giving rise to interstices.
Neither the Constitution, nor Congress in legislating, nor the executive branch in drafting treaties, can anticipate every question likely to
arise under its laws and, therefore, courts must of necessity fill these
interstices when deciding cases under these laws. Sometimes the interstices in federal laws are so wide that courts appear to be indulging in
common law rulemaking, thus giving rise to the term "federal common law." The cases do not differ in kind, however, but only in the
degree of specificity used by the drafters of the congressional, constitutional, or treaty-based federal law. In all cases, the courts must supply
meaning to a vague law in an area in which the intent of its drafters
may not be apparent. Hart and Wechsler have noted this insight,
stating that
the term federal common law, is not analytically precise. The
demarcation between "statutory interpretation" or "constitutional
interpretation," on the one hand, and judge-made law on the
other, is not a sharp line. Statutory interpretation shades into
judicial lawmaking on a spectrum, as specific evidence of legislative advertence to the issue at hand attenuates.10
Thus, instead of classifying the cases into "federal common law"
cases and other federal cases, it is far more useful for purposes of the
adoption analysis to consider all federal cases requiring interstitial
judicial lawmaking in one class. This classification would include
cases like Beaver County, involving some word or phrase of a federal
statute that Congress has left undefined,"" as well as cases involving
'6

Hart & Wechsler, supra note 73, at 770.

See also DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580-81 (1956) (Court adopted state law to
define term "children" for purposes of copyright renewal under federal statute). See generally
Hart & Weehsler, supra note 73, at 491-92.
164
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an implied right of action, like Burks v. Lasker,' 5s in which most of
the elements of a cause of action are left for judicial implementation.
Also included, of course, would be cases like an SEC suit seeking an
injunction for alleged violations of rule lOb-5 against an attorney who
is aiding and abetting a fraud. Such cases require interstitial lawmaking because rule lOb-5 says nothing about aiding and abetting or
about the standards of conduct to which attorneys are to be held, but
instead leaves the matter for judicial determination. Thus, employing
this single category eliminates the obfuscatory effects of the concept of
federal common law.
The issue of adoption arises in this judicial interstitial lawmaking
context as a logical outcome of our federal system of lawmaking.
Because federal lawmakers enact laws against the background of state
law,' 66 courts may turn naturally to state law to fill interstices in
federal statutes when the drafters of federal law have failed to make
their intent known. Thus, in every instance of federal interstitial
lawmaking, the option of creating a uniform federal rule of whole
cloth or of adopting ready-made state standards exists.
We turn next to the specific question whether state standards of
professional responsibility should fill interstices in federal law regarding the obligations under which attorneys act in practicing securities
law.
III
APPLICATION OF THE ADOPTION ANALYSIS

FOR ATTORNEYS' DUTIES UNDER THE
SECURITIES LAWS

A. The Hypothetical Worst Case
This paper does not seek to suggest the total content of professional responsibility rules to be incorporated into the securities laws.
The variety of factual patterns under which the issue of an attorney's
duty may arise, as well as the debate over the meaning of the codes of
professional responsibility in various contexts, make clear that the
area is too unsettled to attempt such an enterprise. In this Article, I
address only the question whether state rules should be adopted as
federal law; and for this purpose it may be best merely to illustrate the
proposed process by one hypothetical case. To best advance the anal-

165

441 U.S. 471 (1979).

'

See text accompanying notes 72-74 supra.
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ysis, I posit what may be the "worst case" for adoption-one in which
a state rule is directly opposed to the duty that would be placed on
attorneys by the SEC rule in William R. Carter.117 And to avoid loss
of focus on the issue of adoption, the Kimbell Foods adoption analysis
is applied only to the skeletal form of this worst case.
The Commission's announced rule in Carter and a proposal of
the American Trial Lawyers' Foundation (ATLF) arising out of the
NationalStudent Marketing debate, compose the skeletal form of this
worst case for adoption.
In Carter, the SEC sought to determine "the professional obligations of the lawyer who gives essentially correct disclosure advice to a
client that does not follow that advice and as a result violates the
federal securities laws."' 6 It then incorporated its resolution of the
issue in a recent "Request for Comments on Standard of Conduct
Constituting Unethical or Improper Professional Practice Before the
Commission," 69 stating that:
Within the context of the facts of In re Carter, the Commission determined that the following standard of unethical or improper professional conduct would be appropriate in similar cases
in the future:
When a lawyer with significant responsibilities in the
effectuation of a company's compliance with the disclosure
requirements of the federal securities laws becomes aware
that his client is engaged in a substantial and continuing
failure to satisfy those disclosure requirements, his continued participation violates professional standards unless70 he
takes prompt steps to end the client's noncompliance.
As a general matter the Commission found that a lawyer
must, in order to discharge his professional responsibilities, make
all efforts within reason to persuade his client to avoid to [sic]
terminate proposed illegal action. Such efforts could include,
where appropriate,
notification to the board of directors of a cor17
porate client. 1

167

William B. Carter, SEC Exch. Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC Docket 292 (1981).

168Id. at 320.
169SEC Exch.

Act Release No. 6344, 23 SEC Docket 826 (1981). It is not clear whether the
Commission proposes to adopt a regulation or merely wishes to issue a release in order to solidify
the position it originally stated in Carter.
17oId. at 827-28 (quoting Carter, 22 SEC Docket at 322).
171Id. at 827 (quoting Carter, 22 SEC Docket at 320).
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Under the asserted rule, in at least some situations, an attorney

whose disclosure advice is ignored by the chief executive officer, and
who fails to inform the board of directors of such noncompliance,

risks SEC sanctions for violation of professional standards. This may
be a perfectly reasonable requirement.'

72

But let us assume in our

hypothetical case that this rule is contrary to applicable state law, as it
could be if the state had adopted the ATLF proposal for standards of

professional conduct and the corporation acted as described in the
following hypothetical.
Rule 2.5 of the ATLF proposal reads:
2.5. A lawyer representing a corporation shall, at the outset of the
lawyer-client relationship, inform the board of directors of potential conflicts that might develop among the interests of the board,
corporate officers, and shareholders. The lawyer shall receive from
the board instructions in advance as to how to resolve such conflicts, and shall take reasonable steps to ensure that officers with
whom the lawyer deals, and the shareholders, are made aware of
how the lawyer has been instructed to resolve conflicts of interest.

173

Under this rule of professional conduct we shall assume, as apparently
was intended, that a lawyer would have no duty to discontinue representation or to inform the board or shareholders of the corporation, or

the SEC, if there were a prior agreement between the lawyer and the
board that obligated the attorney to maintain confidentiality after
becoming aware of a corporate officer's misconduct. 174 This, of
course, is in direct conflict with the rule the SEC seeks to establish.
172 For a reasoned argument supporting the Carterrule under state law, see ABA Model Rules
of Professional Conduct rule 1.13, Legal Background (proposed final draft May 30, 1981).
173 American Trial Law. Foundation, The American Lawyer's Code of Conduct rule 2.5
(discussion draft June 1980).
,74 In commentary, the ATLF explains the policy underlying this proposed rule:
One of the conundrums of professional ethics has been the responsibility of a corporate lawyer who learns from a corporate official that the official has engaged In Illegal
conduct, either against or on behalf of the company. In informing the lawyer, the official
has assumed a confidential relationship. Nevertheless, the lawyer may feel compelled to
inform the board of directors, which is generally regarded as the embodiment of the
corporate entity. If the board fails to take appropriate action, however, the lawyer may
then feel an obligation to inform the shareholders (although the general public will then
learn about the problem, to the likely disadvantage of the company). As the question Is
frequently posed, who is the lawyer's client in those circumstances?
Although it has not been generally recognized, the problem is basically a familiar and
relatively simple one of conflict of interest. The lawyer's difficulty is insoluble only because
the lawyer has failed to inform the board of readily foreseeable conflicts of interest and to
receive guidance in advance. On the basis of the board's instructions, the lawyer can then
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For our illustrative purposes let us assume that the chief executive
officer of a corporation tells the corporation's general counsel, who
advises on disclosure obligations, that he or she has used ten million
dollars of the corporation's funds to bribe local officials over a period
of time "to facilitate" the corporation's obtaining a cable television
franchise from a municipality. Assume further that in accordance
with ATLF rule 2.5, the board of directors had previously instructed
the lawyer to maintain the chief executive's confidences and that the
shareholders had been properly notified of this instruction. Further,
to sharpen the instructiveness of the hypothetical, assume, despite the
fact that it is not clear, that under these circumstances the SEC rule
would require disclosure to the board while the ATLF rule, as implemented by the corporation, would prohibit such disclosure. Should
the attorney, who observes his or her agreement under rule 2.5, be
subject to liability in various securities law proceedings or should the
state rule be adopted as federal law?
B. Applying the Adoption Analysis to
Substantive Law Liability
Suppose the SEC charges the lawyer with aiding and abetting the
chief executive of the corporation by failing to disclose the bribes and
brings an action seeking an injunction for violation of rule 10b-5.1 75
Will the lawyer be successful in urging that he or she observed the
professional obligations imposed by the state law rule, ATLF rule 2.5,
and that this rule should control to excuse him or her from liability?

make sure that each interested party is informed in advance and is thereby ina position to
seek adequate protection.
For example, the board might prefer to maximize candor between its officers and the
lawyer, and therefore instruct the lawyer to honor the officers confidences, even in
reporting to the board. The shareholders would then be in a position to approve or
disapprove that policy, or to relinquish their shares. As an alternative, the board might
prefer to know everything the lawyer knows. In that event, the officers would be on notice
that in some circumstances they might want to consult with personal counsel before
disclosing certain information to corporate counsel. Rule 2.5 requires the lawyer to take
the reasonable steps necessary to avoid the situation in which the lawyer has awkward
information, and cannot either disclose it or keep it confidential without betraying someone's reasonable expectations of trust.
Id. at 203-04.
I's
Although some question exists as to whether a duty to disclose would arise under federal
securities laws, we shall assume that a court, given our hypothetical circumstances, would so
decide. These facts may also show a violation of the accounting provisions of the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (Supp. IV 1980) (amending § 13(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act).
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This hypothetical provides a classic case for adoption analysis.
Manifestly the question in the injunction case is whether the last
element of the aiding and abetting test is satisfied-whether a duty
was violated. The outcome of the case will turn on how "duty" is
defined by the court; the court must decide whether a special relationship existed between the attorney and the corporation or its shareholders and whether the attorney breached the resulting affirmative
duty to reveal to the board of directors the chief executive officer's
bribes. 176 This is precisely the type of case that requires interstitial
lawmaking through adoption analysis. The SEC's Carter rule was an
attempt by the SEC to fill interstices left in federal law as to the
attorney's professional duties. It was derived through interpretation of
the phrase, "unethical or improper professional conduct" in rule
2(e).1 77 Thus, it is not an antifraud rule per se, but it is relevant, if at
all, as a federal ethical rule in the duty analysis. It is of the same order
as ATLF rule 2.5, and the determination of which of the conflicting
rules controls substantive law liabilities depends on whether an interest analysis favors a federal rule or a state rule to define lawyers'
duties.
1. The Special Problem of the SEC as an Independent
Administrative Agency
The first question that should be raised in applying an adoption
analysis to this hypothetical is whether the SEC, as an independent
administrative agency, 178 is obligated to observe the interest analysis
of Kimbell Foods in adopting agency rules just as a court would be
obligated in making a judicial interpretation of rule 10b-5. As previously noted, when Congress is silent on the issue of adoption and there
is no basis for inferring legislative intent as to the ambiguous element
of federal law, the Supreme Court requires the lower courts to determine whether state law should be adopted. 179 In making this determination, unless something in the nature of the federal system or in
such general statutes as the Rules of Decision Act governs, 80 the
adoption question is a matter of judicial, and not legislative, policy.' 81

178
177

For the elements of aiding and abetting, see text accompanying notes 25-26 supra.
See note 5 supra.

178Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 4, 78 U.S.C. § 78d (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
179 See text accompanying note 85 supra.
110See notes 147-48 and accompanying text supra.
181 See text accompanying note 86 supra.
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One might argue under this framework that because Congress
has established the SEC as an independent administrative agency with
jurisdiction to adopt rules to enforce congressional policy, the SEC
may establish its own policy, independently of any judicial policy, to
decide issues to which Congress did not address itself or express its
intent. This policy would be established under the SEC's inherent
rulemaking authority and would be beyond subsequent judicial scrutiny as to the propriety of its policy concerning adoption. From this
perspective, the SEC is free to fashion its own rule to decide whether a
uniform federal rule should apply, or under what circumstances state
law should be adopted. Thus, the Commission would be free to adopt
a uniform federal Carterrule without first applying Kimbell Foods.
This conclusion seems to conflict, however, with the strong federal interests that underlie the Court decisions leading to Kimbell
Foods. First, the recent cases point to an intrinsic principle of the
federal interstitial law, derived from the constitutional structure of
the federal system, that regards the accommodation of state and
federal interests as a truly federal interest.'"-2 These federalism concerns would be exacerbated if administrative agencies were given
discretion to resolve adoption issues free from the policies established
by the Court. The resulting administration of federalism would then
differ depending on whether a court or federal agency was interpreting federal law, and the treatment accorded state interests would
probably also differ among agencies. Hence, as a matter of constitutional policy, administrative agencies should probably be required to
follow the same framework of analysis as do the courts.
If the adoption question is not regulated by mere judicial policy
but falls under the governance of the Rules of Decision Act,10 the
express statutory law as well as constitutional policy would compel
agencies to adhere to a Kimbell Foods interest analysis. Agencies
would not be permitted to establish their own policies of adoption but
rather would be subject to the same constraints that underlie the
184
Kimbell Foods analysis.

182 E.g.,

Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 491-502 (19S0); see text accompanying

note 137 supra; notes 86, 137 supra.

M 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976) (quoted in note 147 supra); see notes 147-48 supra.
4 The fact that agencies may not be competent independently to promulgate professional
standards should also constrain their action in this area. The Commission has been charged with
lack of expertise in professional ethics. See Daley & Karmel, supra note 12. at 785. This, if

conceded, should be a sufficient basis for deferring to bodies primarily concerned with that
subject, such as bar associations.

Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Law Review

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:1230

Nevertheless, whether or not that analysis is specifically man-

dated by the above considerations, the interest analysis should be
adopted as a matter of agency policy and should be similar to the
analysis that follows. 8

5

2. The Interest Analysis
Assuming that the questions just raised do not result in preclusion
of an interest analysis by the court hearing the injunction suit, what

would be the result of that analysis in determining whether the lawyer
had a duty to resign or reveal the bribes to the board?"I

That

185
There is (precedent for the Commission to adopt state law to govern the existence of
shareholders' rights. For example, Proxy Rule 14a-8(c)(1), 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8(c)(1)1 (1981),
promulgated under the 1934 Act, adopts the law of the state of incorporation to determine
whether shareholders' proposals are proper subjects for inclusion in proxy solicitations. Another
example of adoption in codified federal law, this one outside the securities context, Is offered In
the federal rule of evidence concerning privileged communications. Congress there refused a
Supreme Court uniform rule proposal and instead established uniform federal rules of privilege
for federal elements of law but provided for the adoption of state rules of privilege for elements
for which state law supplies the rule of decision. Fed. R. Evid. 501.
Similarly, the SEC could establish uniform federal professional standards, assuming their
validity, for practice before the SEC, while adopting state standards to apply In all other
contexts. Clearly, the SEC's interest in establishing its own code of ethics for lawyers is strongest
in relation to cases brought before it in administrative proceedings. William R. Carter, SEC
Exch. Act Release No. 17,597, 22 SEC Docket 292 (1981). But see Daley & Karmel, supra note
12, at 785 (charging the SEC with lack of expertise in formulating rules of professional ethics),
Whether or not the strength of federalism interests or the lack of expertise in defining professional standards still favor the adoption of state standards involves an interest analysis beyond
the scope of this Article. In any event, an interest analysis still seems required.
186 There remains some question whether rule 1Ob-5 liability can ever be imposed in a private
action against an attorney for failure to go to the board of directors. Professor Fischel has argued
that because the "enforcement rationale," enunciated by the Supreme Court in J.I. Case Co. v.
Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964), has been rejected by the Court as a basis for inferring a private
right of action under rule 10b-5, see Transamerica Mortgage Advisers, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S.
11, 24 (1979) (court will not imply a private cause of action without a showing of congressional
intent); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 571, 577 (1979), it cannot support tho
bringing of private actions against aiders and abettors. Fischel, supra note 24, at 100-02, This
"enforcement rationale," rejected by the Court, allows private parties to bring private actions In
order to enhance the SEC's enforcement of the securities laws. In this way, itis akin to the
"'access theory," relying on private individuals to enforce fully SEC policies. See note 28 supra.
Professor Fischel argues that the rule established by recent Court decisions, which rejects
generalized references to remedial purposes as a basis for finding implied rights of action and
instead requires evidence of congressional intent, bars use of the access theory as a means of
reaching aiders and abettors. Fischel, supra, at 93-100. This reasoning is unpersuasive, however.
Although the Court rejects the rationale of Borak, it refuses to overturn its rule of providing an
implied right of action essentially because hundreds of lower court decisions have relied on It. See
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196-97 (1976). Logically, the lack of congressional
intent should also not bar aider and abettor liability under rule 1Ob-5 and § 14(a), since the lower
courts are nearly unanimous in holding aiders and abettors liable. See Fischel, supra, at 81-84
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process, as we have seen, 187 requires first, a determination of whether
the state rule would frustrate the federal interests and second, if no
direct conflict arises, a balancing of the interests to determine the
weightier set to be served.
Under the suit to enjoin the attorney, the federal policy to be
served by rule 10b-5 is the protection of the securities markets from
manipulation, in a technical sense, or misrepresentations made with
scienter by issuers whose shares are being publicly traded.'" In the
present context, there is no manipulation; hence, the relevant interest
is in avoiding misrepresentation. This would include a duty to correct,
in certain circumstances, although the duty depends on various nu-

ances of fact. 18 9

(citing cases). The Supreme Court has expressly reserved this issue. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfclder,
425 U.S. at 191 n.7.
18 See text accompanying notes 158-59 supra.
188
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980) (scienter required in SEC actions), Santa Fe Indus.,
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (rule lOb-5 limited to deceit or manipulation); Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) (deceit or manipulation with scienter necessary in a private
action). An affirmative duty to disclose, although much discussed, and the subject of dicta in a
few opinions, has never been established by a court. See Coldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209. 221
n.10 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDon.
nell Douglas Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 519 (10th Cir.) (en bane) (per curiam), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
874 (1973). See generally Bauman, Rule lOb-5 and the Corporation's Affirmative Duty to
Disclose, 67 Geo. L.J. 935 (1979). Securities practitioners, however, believe that good practice
calls for disclosure. Schneider & Shargel, "Now That You Are Publicly Owned. ...
" 36 Bus.
Law. 1631, 1643-44 (1981).
The Second Circuit recently has held that rule lOb.5 extends protection not only to buyers
and sellers of securities, but also to non-buyers and sellers when there is fraud in connection with
a purchase or sale. United States v. Newman, [1981 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
98,332 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981). The court does not disturb, however, the Supreme Court's ruling
in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), that only buyers and sellers can
bring private actions under rule 10b-5.
189 See, e.g., Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 169-64 (2d Cir. 19SO) (company
has no duty to correct outsider statements for which it is not responsible that do not accord with
the company's own evaluations); Ross v. A.H. Robins Co., 465 F. Supp. 904, 90S (S.D.N.Y.)
(company has duty to correct prior statement, accurate when made, which becomes misleading
due to subsequent events and which "remains alive" to public), revd on other grounds, 607 F.2d
545 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 946 (1980). See also Fischer v. Kletz, 266 F. Supp.
180, 188-89 (S.D.N.Y. 1967); Fiflis, Current Problems of Accountant Responsibilities to Third
Parties, 28 Vand. L. Rev. 31, 128-30 (1975) (discussing other cases): Schneider & Shargel, supra
note 188, at 1643-44.
In our hypothetical case this federal policy of rule lOb-5 could reasonably be held to place
upon the chief executive officer and the corporation a duty to disclose the bribes. In Carter.the
Commission seems to have rejected the proposition that the circumstances warrant placing on
the attorneys a duty to correctprior representations of the client corporation. William R.Carter.
SEC Exch. Act Release No. 17,597, 22 S.E.C. Docket 292, 317 n.59 (1981). Hence, presumably
the only duty under the Carterrule applicable to our hypothetical ease would be the duty to go
to the directors with the information.
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Applying the first step of the Kimbell Foods analysis, the state
rule of ATLF rule 2.5, if adopted, probably would not frustrate the
federal policy to the degree necessary to be considered "hostile or
aberrant" under Little Lake Misere,190 and therefore would not be
absolutely barred from adoption. Even if the attorney is excused from
a duty to go to the board, the chief executive officer'"' continues to be
under a duty to disclose the facts. Moreover, the firm's auditors,
internal or external, or its other employees, may uncover the bribes.
The attorney is not the sole source of protection. Thus, the federal
interest in truthful disclosure will not necessarily be defeated if counsel is not held to this duty. While it is true that threatening attorneys
with liability will probably increase the likelihood of such disclosure,
the absence of such a threat will neither prevent disclosure by principals nor otherwise totally frustrate this policy. 19 2 It is also likely that
many attorneys will exert equal pressure on management to make
truthful disclosure with or without the threat of personal liability
hanging over them. 9 3 Moreover, preserving the chief executive officer's confidences may encourage him or her to seek legal advice which
otherwise would not be sought and actually increase disclosure as a
result of the attorney's counselling. Hence, the federal policy will not
be totally defeated by excusing counsel, although perhaps it may be
diminished by inconsistencies to be weighed under the Kimbell Foods
balancing test.
Next, we consider the federal interest in uniformity as the second
phase of the adoption analysis. Uniformity is not required merely for
the sake of uniformity; it becomes a legitimate federal interest only if
"adopting state law would adversely affect administration of the federal programs," 94 thereby frustrating the purpose of the federal statute. 9 5 Thus, as the Court stated in Burks v. Lasker, the uniformity
analysis is subsumed under the general inquiry into the consistency of

'9

See text accompanying note 110 supra.

,91 The inanimate corporation may also be placed under this duty even though its directors arc
ignorant of the underlying facts. Cf. Franchard Corp., 42 S.E.C. 163, 178 (1964) (disclosure
may be required in a prospectus when particular corporate transactions have raised questions of
noncompliance with state or federal law).
192Cf. United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947) (increased deterrence produced
by adding liability to the United States for loss of services of an injured soldier to potential tort
liability did not sufficiently further the state interest to require adoption of state law). See also
note 104 supra.
"I See ABA Code of Professional Responsibility Disciplinary Rule 7-102(B)(1) (1980), which
requires this exhortation.
'9 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 730 (1979).
195 See text accompanying notes 132-33, 142 supra.
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the state and federal interests. This " 'consistency' requirement ...
guarantees that state laws failing to meet these standards will be
precluded."'196 Under this uniformity requirement, a uniform federal
rule will apply only if the federal program would be totally frustrated, as in Little Lake Misere, or if the application of varying state
rules adopted as a matter of federal law would cause undue interference with federal interests.
Applying this analysis to the policies of rule 10b-5, state law
would be precluded only if the federal interest in preventing misrepresentation would be disrupted by the adoption of varying state rules. It
may be urged that because corporations often transact affairs across
numerous state lines, the determination of which state's law to adopt
may disrupt effective enforcement of federal policy or that application
of various states' laws will burden enforcement. However, the decision as to which state's law should control is probably a matter of
federal law 197 which can readily accommodate this federal concern as
well as the competing state interests. In addition, the application of
varying rules in this context is no more disruptive than what the Court
required in Burks v. Lasker in another context.'98 There the Court
expressed no concern as to potential inconvenience to enforcement.
In further support of adoption, the Court has noted the value of
establishing a single rule to regulate primary private activity. For
example, in Wilson v. Omaha Indian Tribe19 the Court made express
reference to the undesirable effects of having one rule regulate the
riparian fights of Indians and a different rule regulate the rights of
non-Indians.200 In the case of attorneys, the matter is exacerbated
because the conflicting SEC and state rules may apply to the same
attorney when he or she is involved with an SEC-regulated matter
and a non-SEC matter. Moreover, the attorney may be subjected to

' BuArks v. Lasker,

441 U.S. 471, 479 n.6 (1979).

197See note 58 supra.

M 441 U.S. 471 (1979). If ATLF rule 2.5 were to become the general state law rule, there is
some authority for rejecting an inconsistent federal rule. As Kimbll Foods Itself pointed out,
quoting Judge Friendly in United States v. Wegematic Corp., 360 F.2d 674, 676 (2d Cir. 196:
When the states have gone so far in achieving the desirable goal of a uniform law

governing commercial transactions, it would be a distinct disservice to insist on a differnt
one for the segment of commerce, important but still small in relation to the total,
consisting of transactions with the United States.
440 U.S. 715, 732 (1979). Although the securities markets are very large, professional responsibility in securities laws is very small compared to the general scope of attorney practice to which
codes of professional responsibility apply.
1- 442 U.S. 653 (1979).
0 Id. at 674.
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suspension from SEC practice for behavior that he
or she pursues in
20 1
order to avoid violating the state rules of ethics.
Finally, we must identify in the context of our hypothetical the
state interests underlying ATLF rule 2.5 and weigh them against the
federal interests evidenced in rule 10b-5. The very specific ATLF rule
appears to embody state interests in (1) providing the chief executive
officer with assurance that his or her confidence will be honored by
the attorney, thereby encouraging the seeking of legal advice untrammelled by a fear of exposure, (2) the attorney providing zealous representation to corporate officers free from the risk that he or she will be
held liable for not disclosing confidential information,2 02 and (3) providing order to corporate affairs through adequate notice to all members of the corporation as to the nature of the attorney's duties in
representing the corporation. These state interests must be weighed
against the federal interest of avoiding misrepresentation to investors.
Obviously the decision of how much weight to give to each set of
interests in deciding the adoption issue is a subjective one and therefore opinions may differ. But since the federal interest in protecting
investors from misrepresentations may be satisfied through duties
placed on the corporate principals while the state interests in maintaining attorney-client confidences and giving adequate notice to
shareholders may be served only if state law is adopted, the scales
seem to favor adopting ATLF rule 2.5 to define the attorney's duty in
representing the chief executive officer. Hence, no liability for aiding
and abetting should arise in our hypothetical.
C. Applying the Adoption Analysis to
Clause (ii) of Rule 2(e)(1)
Suppose that instead of charging violation of a substantive securities law provision, the SEC in our hypothetical institutes a rule 2(e)
proceeding to suspend the attorney from practice under clause (ii),
charging the attorney with "unethical or improper professional conduct." If clause (ii) were merely an in-house rule, regulating only
attorney conduct taking place before the SEC, and restricting only
future practice before the SEC as a consequence of disbarment, the
federal interest would be substantially stronger and the state could
claim only a small interest in the administration of SEC actions.
However, under the current application of clause (ii), the attorney
201 Cf. Hart, supra note 1, at 489 ("People repeatedly subjected.
to two or more inconsistent sets of directions, without means of resolving inconsistencies, could not fail In the end to
react as [Pavlov's] dogs did. The society, collectively would suffer a nervous breakdown.").
202 See Marsh, supra note 5, at 1010-11; Michigan Note, supra note 7, at 1276-77.
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may be reached even though his or her alleged misconduct does not
take place in a transaction with the Commission or in a Commission
hearing.20 3 Furthermore, under the SEC staff's view of the scope of
disbarment from securities practice, the attorney may be prohibited
from giving advice to clients on all securities law matters even though
these also may not involve the Commission. 0 4 Given the expansive
scope applied by the SEC to the reach of clause (ii) actions, it is
difficult to perceive any stronger federal interest than those involved
in the rule 10b-5 injunctive proceeding. First, to the extent that
violations of clause (ii) that do not involve dealings with the SEC
could be used to disbar the attorney from filing documents with the
Commission or participating in adjudicative proceedings before the
Commission or one of its administrative law judges, the disbarment
resembles a refusal to admit the lawyer to practice because of a
claimed defect in character or fitness. In this instance, the violative
conduct has no relationship to the practice for which the attorney is
barred. Since the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) itself prohibits
agencies from licensing persons for initial practice before it,205 the
SEC's enforcement procedure itself may contravene this provision
under these circumstances. Also, although the APA does not "limit the
discipline, including disbarment, of individuals who appearin a representative capacity before an agency,"208 it does not authorize disbarment from the practice of securities law outside of the agency context.
Thus, if there is a federal policy permitting the disbarment of the
attorney from general securities practice in our hypothetical case, that
policy must be the SEC's "access theory." This would place the attorney within the scope of practice before the SEC by requiring him or
her to aid the SEC in enforcing the securities laws by revealing to the
board the chief executive officer's bribes.
Even assuming the validity of the access theory in this context,2 0'
its purpose is to prevent violation of the substantive provisions of the
securities laws by principals, and hence the charge under clause (ii)
03 See Marsh, supra note 5, at 993-94; William R. Carter, SEC Exch. Act Release No. 17,597,
22 SEC Docket 292, 323 (1981). But see Greene Speech, supra note 7.

See Daley & Karmel, supra note 12, at 763-65; Marsh, supra note 5, at 993-95.
- 5 U.S.C. § 500(b) (1976) (any person is authorized to represent another before an agency if
he is a member in good standing of the bar of the highest court of a state). Commentators have
2

also argued that the legislative history of the securities lavs~ suggests that the cause for disbar-

ment must arise from misconduct in a transaction or proceeding with the SEC. Daley & Karmel,
supra note 12. at 781.
5 U.S.C. § 500(d)(2) (1976) (emphasis added).

" For an argument that an aiding and abetting rule is invalid in all contexts, see Fischel,
supra note 24, at 93-100.
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becomes the functional equivalent of charging the attorney with aiding and abetting a fraud. Therefore, the same federal interest is
involved, and again this would not seem to carry sufficient weight to
warrant a uniform federal rule in place of adopting state law.
If, on the other hand, a totally different situation arose in which,
for example, the attorney in our hypothetical had intentionally provided perjured testimony in an SEC hearing, rather than merely
failing to disclose, the express policy of the APA permitting disbarment for misconduct of individuals "who appear in a representative
capacity before [the] agency" 208 would provide an overwhelming federal interest which clearly should prevail. Indeed, it is doubtful that
one could posit a reasonable state interest that could displace the
federal interest in regulating practice before the SEC. Any state rule
that approaches legitimization of such action would
clearly violate the
20 9
Little Lake Misere "aberrant or hostile" test.
CONCLUSION

Although at first blush it seems inconsistent with the concept of
federal law, under a Kimbell Foods interest analysis some circumstances may warrant application of state law to determine the aider
and abettor liability of attorneys for alleged substantive violations of
the federal securities laws. This may have an important impact on the
practice of securities law since state standards are generally less farreaching than those recently espoused by the Commission. The determination of whether state law will indeed be adopted depends on
application of an interest analysis, outlined in several recent Supreme
Court opinions, to compare federal and state policies touching the
particular activity left undefined in federal law. In the context of
substantive violations by attorneys, under this analysis state interests
may not conflict directly with federal policies and may be sufficiently
compelling to justify adoption of state law. It also appears that the
SEC, in adopting professional standards for the regulation of securities practice under its rule 2(e), may be obligated, if the interest
analysis is rigorously applied, to adopt state law to regulate attorney
conduct in transactions other than those directly with the Commission.
208

5 U.S.C. § 500(d)(2)(1976).

The application of a uniform federal standard to actual practice before an agency, but
local rules for other practice, is espoused in the ABA Model Rules of Federal Agency Discipline
promulgated by the ABA's Standing Committee on Professional Discipline. See Greene Speech,
supra note 7.
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